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Abstract 
 
Data integrity and source origin authentication are essential topics for real-time 
multimedia systems. But the traditional methods are not very applicable to overcome the 
distortion introduced in multimedia data transportation. In this thesis some security 
mechanics are proposed, which rely on authentication rather than on encryption methods. 
The highly asymmetric architectures found in ubiquitous computing applications are 
exploited to provide a protection of the transmitted multimedia data by means of well-
known digital watermarking techniques. The advocated approach adopts public key 
encryption to efficiently generate non-repudiate multimedia data, whereas both the digital 
watermark generation and the authentication algorithms are public.  
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Driving Force of Digital Watermarking Research 
Digital cameras and video recorders are widely used nowadays. The digital pictures 
and video appear in the internet or are stored in portal storages such as DVDs and magnetic 
disks. The popularity of digital multimedia causes two serious problems: 1) the multimedia 
products are easily to download and reproduce for the commercial profit. That is the so-
called intelligent property privacy; 2) with the fast adoption of the powerful multimedia 
manipulation tools, multimedia data such as pictures, video or audio clips have been 
decreased the credibility.  
Authenticity has broad meanings [1.4]: 1) not false or imitation; 2) confirming to or 
based on facts; 3) no one has tampered with the contents; 4) something is actually from the 
original source. For multimedia protection, the third meaning is about integrity of 
multimedia data and people use the word “copyright protection" to indicate the fourth 
meaning. 
So-called multimedia authentications are techniques for multimedia integrity 
verification and source origin authentication. The techniques are implemented by means of 
digital signature or digital watermarking. Digital signature is a non-repudiatible, encrypted 
message digest extracted from the content. It is usually stored as a separate file, which can 
be attached to the data to prove integrity and originality. On the contrary, digital 
watermarking takes the approach of inserting watermark into the multimedia data thus that 
the watermark is residing in the protected multimedia data.  
Traditional digital signature is so vulnerable that a bit alteration in multimedia data or 
signature may disable the authentication. On the contrary, watermarking techniques are 
more flexible to survive some manipulations. Therefore, people look digital watermarking 
as a promising solution for multimedia protection. 
Two recent published books written by I. Cox et al. [1.1] and M. Arnold et al. [1.2] 
give a complete literature survey of the state-of-the-art digital watermarking techniques. 
The main driving forces that led researchers to do work in this area are protection on the 
copyrights of digital multimedia, such as audio, images, and video. Due to the enormous 
increase of Internet data communications, the producers of such multimedia data feel 
“threatened” by the presence of attackers (also called hackers or pirates) who could get hold 
of copyrighted data and possibly sell them as their own products on the Internet or even 
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give them away for free (e.g., Napster). It has been reported that the audio industry, for 
example, loses billions of U.S. dollars every year due to pirated audio clips.  
It is worth to be mentioned that, at the time of this writing, most ideas in this field are 
presented and the research of watermarking has gone into a bottleneck unless there is a 
breakthrough on human vision/audio system. Watermarking was once considered to be a 
promising solution since it can protect the copyright of multimedia data. However, until 
today, watermarking techniques are still far from practical. In author’s point of view, it is 
quite difficult to make it commercial in the near future.  As a result, although many 
watermarking companies exist at present, none of them seem profitable for the moment. 
 
1.2 Applications 
Digital watermarking is being used in numerous applications. Most of the current 
applications are devoted to copyright protection. It has the following purposes in general: 
(1) Covert Communications: These are mainly applications of steganography. In military 
and intelligence applications, people would like to send messages to each other without 
being detected.  
(2) Authentication: Sometimes it is necessary to verify the authenticity of input data, i.e., to 
determine whether the data are original, fake, or the altered version of the original. For 
authentication purposes, fragile watermarks seem to be a good solution; a properly designed 
fragile watermarking algorithm should be able to detect any alterations. 
(3) Identification of Ownership: Robust watermarking algorithms are developed to identify 
the ownership of digital media. In this kind of applications, a movie producer selling its 
products in digital formats is subject to copyright piracy. In such situations, original 
producers would like to have legally proof that they are the real owners. A well-designed 
robust watermarking scheme is a possible solution to these cases. Additionally, to prevent 
the unauthorized users from playing the digital products, some media player manufacturers 
consider adding the watermarking detection facilities in their products. In such a scenario, 
media players would play the input clips only if they successfully detect the watermark of 
the company and confirm the authorization of the consumers. This is similar to DRM (short 
for digital right management) solutions except that watermarking is more resistant to media 
processing. 
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  Classification of Digital Watermarking Applications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Classification of Digital Watermarking Applications 
 
 
Different scenarios for digital watermarking yield different constraints and 
specifications. Therefore, they have to be treated differently. The watermarking applications 
can be categorize according to their usage and requirements. Figure 1.1 illustrates our 
classification. 
The first class is steganography. Here the goal is to have a covert communication 
channel between two parties of the communication. The existence of this channel should be 
unknown to a possible attacker.  
The second class is copyright protection. Here, the goal is to embed copyright 
information within the host data. The possible hidden data is known at the receiving end. 
The receiver is designed to “verify” reliably the existence (or non-existence) of a digital 
watermark in the received data. It has three kinds of applications:   
• Robust media protection. The goal is to remain a digital watermark even undergoing 
some serious manipulation.  
• Authentication application, its goal is to embed information in a robust way such that 
in case of manipulations, it should be possible to state that the data have been 
modified. Therefore, for fragile watermarking, broken watermark indicates the 
alterations. 
Digital Watermarking 
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Protection 
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for Multimedia 
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• Hardware Support. It is the multimedia reader/writer accessorized with copyright 
protection components. The hardware solution is the ultimate way to eliminate the 
copyright piracy. The ideal solution is to install a small chip, which can recognize the 
copyright of media products, on DVD players in order to prevent the customers from 
copying commercial videos.  
 
The third class is security methods for real-time multimedia communication. Here, the 
hidden message is known to both the embedder and receiver. If the original host data are 
available (respectively unavailable) at the decoder, then the problem is blind decoding 
(respectively non-blind decoding).  
Some researchers are working on applying digital watermarking into multimedia data 
indexing [1.2, 1.3]. 
 
1.3 Core of the Thesis 
Digital watermarking can link some useful information to the multimedia data by 
embedding watermarks into the original data. Hence, an attacker cannot remove the 
embedded watermarks easily. A large variety of digital watermarking algorithms has been 
proposed and nearly none of them is applicable for real-life applications. Many of these 
algorithms operate in time domain or frequency domain.  
The digital watermarks embedded in the original data usually include some useful 
information, e.g., name of the authors, date of generation, or copyright holders. With the use 
of the blind digital watermarking algorithm, the embedded digital watermark can be 
extracted accurately without the need of the original multimedia data. Fragile audio 
watermarking algorithms can detect severe tampers/attacks occurred on the multimedia 
data. Therefore it is a useful method to the ensure authenticity and integrity of multimedia 
data.  
Fragile digital watermarking provides an alternative approach to ensure the safety of 
multimedia data during transmission in openly accessible channels. That is, digital 
watermarks may be generated referring to information on originators, receivers, unique 
serial number, and time stamps. These watermarks are then embedded into the multimedia 
data to assure its integrity and origin source authentication without degrading the overall 
quality of the transmitted multimedia data.  
When inspecting the integrity and authenticity of the transmitted multimedia data, 
some special characters should be taken into account--- the amount of the multimedia data 
is unpredictable, and the occurrences of packet loss and bit errors are also unpredictable. 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the outline of a security mechanism using digital watermarks.  Digital 
watermarking operates on the multimedia data to hide/extract information and this makes 
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this approach different to most of the current cryptography mechanisms. Since the receiver 
can only receive the unpredictable multimedia data, we need an independent reference with 
the help of which to verify the integrity and authenticity of the dynamic multimedia data in 
the transmission. In the proposed approach, both the transmitter and receiver share one 
reference watermark from an independent trustworthy party before the multimedia data 
transmission really starts. To provide the non-repudiate and authenticity, a secret digital 
watermark is deployed and the secret digital watermark has been encrypted with public key 
algorithm, i.e., RSA, for the purpose of source origin authentication.  
The transmitter embeds the digital watermark, W, into the compressed data stream, M, 
to form the outgoing multimedia stream, M’. The receiver extracts the embedded digital 
watermark, W’, from its incoming multimedia stream, M”. This scheme is an integrated 
solution to secure multimedia communication and multimedia data integrity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: A Secure Real-time Communication Integrating Digital Watermarking 
 
The network transportation can be viewed as a noisy channel. The reference digital 
watermark is modulated with multimedia data (carrier) and transmitted onto the noisy 
channel. The digital watermark undergoes the same alterations suffered by the multimedia 
data, thus that the watermark degradation can be used to estimate the overall alterations of 
the multimedia data caused by noises/attacks. So on the receiver’s side, the embedded 
digital watermark is extracted, and compared with the original reference watermark to 
measure the integrity and authenticity of the received multimedia data. 
In Internet telephony and video systems, an audio/visual data packet contains the 
compressed sample for 20 ms or 50 ms, thus a packet loss does not affect the session too 
much. Integrity and authenticity methods (i.e., SRTP [2.1]) which deploys Hash functions 
can measure the integrity of each data packet instead of the whole conversation data which 
consisting of hundreds or thousands of audio data packets. In this thesis, an alternative 
integrity measurement intended for a whole conversation is presented. 
 
Receiver 
Transmitter 
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1.3 Outline of the thesis 
In Chapter 2, we first introduce the security methods deployed in current multimedia 
communications and then present a novel approach to secure the multimedia transmission 
problem using digital watermarking techniques. The proposed scheme has three advantages: 
1, the computation consumption is rather low; 2, source origin authentication becomes 
possible; 3. security scheme protect the whole contents instead of one packet. 
In Chapter 3, we employ the theory developed in Chapter 2 on secure image 
transmission. The proposed security method can be implemented by the low-cost, low-
resource front-end devices.  
In Chapter 4, a speech authentication scheme based on SVD decomposition is 
proposed first; second, a speech watermarking algorithm using frequency domain linear 
prediction is introduced; third, another watermarking algorithm using analysis/synthesis 
model is presented; at last we present a fragile speech watermarking algorithm integrated 
with GSM 610 voice encoder. The last speech watermarking algorithm slightly modifies 
some niches of RPE pulse values; hence it does not degrade the overall quality of speech.  
In Chapter 5, we further focus more on security issues of VoIP systems. Here, we 
present the security scheme using speech watermarking technique. The security framework 
with use of digital watermarking can meet the requirements of integrity and source origin 
authentication in a VoIP scenario. In addition, the timing mechanism is integrated by a quite 
natural manner. 
In Chapter 6, we give an application in e-commerce with the use of the technique 
presented in Chapter 5.
  
 
Chapter 2  Applying Digital Watermarking for Networked Multimedia 
 
 
2.1 Content Security of Networked Multimedia Communication 
 
In networked environments the safety of multimedia data can be investigated 
according to two aspects ― the safety of static data and the data security during dynamic 
communication. The safety of static multimedia data can be inspected according to the 
following four aspects: 
Storage: Is the data centrally stored, or dispersed?  
Vulnerability: How robustness is the data against to theft or abuse? 
Confidence/Authenticity: What constitutes authentic information? Can that 
information be tampered with? 
Linking: Will the multimedia data be linked to other information, e.g., about 
originating and/or consuming party?  
When inspecting the security of real-time multimedia communication, one should 
take into account the specific properties of both multimedia data and real-time 
communication. First, limited distortions in multimedia data can not be perceived by end 
users, so some bit errors and packets loss that may occur during communication do not defect 
the overall visual/audio quality. Secondly, due to scheduling protocols of real-time 
multimedia communication, packet loss may happen. Thirdly, caused by the large amount of 
multimedia data, communication security trade-offs should be low enough.   
Many kinds of cryptographic protocols have been proposed for the security of real-
time multimedia communication. On one hand, some traditional cryptographic protocols, 
which were originated as dedicated mechanisms for Web security, were adapted to real-time 
multimedia communication, e. g., PGP [2.14] is being exploited by Speakfreely [5.8]. On the 
other hand, some security protocols specific to multimedia communication were developed, 
e.g., SRTP [2.1] and H.235 [2.10] for IP telephony. Most of these cryptographic protocols 
provide the functionalities of encryption, integrity, and authenticity. These security aspects 
can be provided by means of different cryptographic techniques such as secret key 
cryptography, public key cryptography, and hash functions, respectively.  
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The first half of this chapter introduces some well-known generic methods to secure 
multimedia data. These approaches are, however, not directly suited to solve the 
authentication problem for multimedia data transmission under the constraints of real-time 
operation and of the considerable restrictions of many low-end devices being used currently 
in ubiquitous computing scenarios. 
Multimedia application systems can be divided into two categories: Stored 
Multimedia Data Stream and Real-Time Multimedia Interactive. A stored multimedia 
application involves some forms of interaction (action-reaction, request-response or exchange 
of information) between two parties (i.e., web browser-to-web server, ftp or http). Examples 
of interactive applications include the following: IP telephony, interactive voice/video, 
videoconferencing, Video-on-demand (VOD), and virtual reality.  
The elapsed time between interactions is essential to the success of an interactive 
application. The degree of interactivity determines the level or stringency of the delay 
requirement. For example, interactive voice applications, which involve human interaction 
(conversation) in real time, have strict delay requirements (in the order of milliseconds). 
Streaming (playback) video applications involve less interaction, (i.e., interaction mostly 
occurs during start, stop, forward, or reverse action on the video) and do not require real-time 
response. Therefore, streaming applications have more relaxed delay requirements (in the 
order of seconds). Often the applications' delay tolerance is determined by the users' delay 
tolerance (i.e., higher delay tolerance leads to more relaxed delay requirements). 
 
2.1.1 Stored Multimedia Data Stream 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Simplest Stored Multimedia Approach 
 
The simplest stored multimedia approach is shown as Figure. 2.1. The most 
commonly-used applications include: 
Web 
Browser 
Media 
Player 
Web Server with 
Multimedia Files 
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• Extraction of audio or video stored in file 
• Multimedia files transferred as HTTP object 
• Multimedia mail 
• Multimedia notes 
In this sub-section, we give a brief introduction to traditional cryptographic solutions 
for the stored multimedia applications, and present some techniques.  
 
 
Figure 2.2:  (a) A Cipher System; (2) A Digital Signature System 
 
Encryption 
Confidentiality, also called secrecy or privacy, is the most fundamental security requirement 
for data communication. It is usually achieved by means of symmetric encryption or 
asymmetric algorithm.  
In a symmetric system [2.13], both encryption and decryption are performed with the 
shared key. In the early years, the participants use the shared key for multiple times. From the 
world war two, the one-time secret key has been widely used. The shared key is usually 
exchanged between the participants with the use of public-key encryption (or called the 
asymmetrical cipher system).  The security of symmetric encryption is vulnerable since the 
attackers can use some skills, i.e., known-plain text attack and chosen-plain text attack to find 
the secret key being used.  
public channel 
public channel 
Encryption Decryption plaintext plaintext 
encrypted text 
public channel 
key 
secure channel 
plaintext 
Encryption Decryption Hashing 
Hashing Authentication 
plaintext 
encrypted hash sum 
key 
secure channel 
(a) 
(b) 
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In an asymmetric system [2.13], each participant has a key pair consisting of a public 
key and a private key. All participants publish their public keys. If one person, A, wants to 
send the other one, B, a message, he just encrypts the plain message with B’s public key and 
sent the encrypted text to B. Only B than other else can decrypt the incoming text with B’s 
private key. The robustness of the asymmetric system is rather strong. In the later part of the 
thesis, both the symmetric and asymmetric algorithms will be deployed in our 
implementation.  
Message Authentication 
 On the contrary to secret encryption algorithms, message authentication algorithms 
[2.13] transmit a plain text and an authentication code together. Message authentication does 
not provide secrecy, but focuses on the integrity and non-repudiability of the message. Every 
one can read the plain text, but any alteration on the text can be noticed. Among many 
message authentication algorithms, some deploy asymmetric encryption algorithms to protect 
the plain text from forgery. Message secrecy is usually accomplished by encryption.  
The transmitter and receiver share the same secret key to compute and verify the 
message authentication code. The message authentication code works as follow: 1) use a one-
way hash function to produce a checksum; 2) encrypt the checksum and append to the 
message; 3) the recipient hashes the received message and compare the checksum with the 
received message authentication code.   
Any alterations made to the message would completely alter the hash code. 
 
2.1.2 Real-Time Multimedia Interactive 
Real-time system is a system can support the execution of applications within a 
specified time window. The time constraints for external processes are seconds for flow 
processes, milliseconds for electric power systems, and 20ms~1m for video and audio 
streaming. Video and audio streaming provides the means of delivering news, entertainment, 
remote education, presentations, and many more types of live communication within a short 
time constraint. Television is the most well known application of streaming media. It already 
feeds wireless multimedia streams into millions of dishes and antennas, connected to TVs and 
other devices.  
Streaming technologies are important since most users do not have access to enough 
connection capacity to download large multimedia files quickly. Using streaming 
technologies, consumers can start listening to the audio stream or view the video stream 
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before the entire file has been received. To allow efficient streaming, the provider needs to 
send the data as a steady stream and the receiver needs to be able to cache excess data in a 
temporary buffer until used.  
To reduce the amount of information transmitted, streaming video and audio data are 
compressed by means of technologies such as MPEG. The streaming video quality depends 
on the capacity of the transmission channel and its ability to support a steady stream—the 
better the channel quality (i.e., higher and steady data rate), the better the quality of the audio 
and video output. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Streamed Multimedia Application Systems 
Figure 2.3 illustrates a typical multimedia streaming system [2.8]. Standing on the top 
of UDP or TCP layer, the early TCP/IP architecture does not provide the necessary 
mechanisms to meet the time constrained requirements of real-time streaming. So IETF 
specified the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [2.11]. RTP is the default standard for 
audio/video transport in IP networks, which was developed the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) as RFC 1889. RTP is a framework for audio or video data delivery, and it has 
some profiles for particular uses. Standing on the top of  
The RTP Specification 
RTP [2.11] is an application level protocol operating over UDP/IP protocol stacks or 
ATM networks. It supports 1 user-to-1 user communication and 1-to-many broadcast as well. 
RTP receives compressed multimedia data from upper audio/video encoder and feeds to UDP 
stack. RTP provides some useful functionality, including timing mechanisms, loss detection, 
quality reporting, for continuous multimedia streaming. There are two parts of RTP: the data 
transfer protocol and an associated control protocol. The RTP data transfer protocol deliver 
real-time multimedia data between two peers in networks. The RTP control protocol (RTCP) 
IP 
                 TCP UDP 
RTP 
 RTCP 
Multimedia Encoder/Decoder 
Call Management  
& Signalling 
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is a signalling protocol providing reception quality feedback, participant identification, and 
synchronization between media streams. RTCP runs alongside RTP and provides periodic 
reporting of this information. 
 
RTP Payload Formats 
 
RTP payload formats specify how particular media types are carried within RTP data 
packet. The individual vendors propose its own proposal to IETF, i.e., RFC 2429/2190 for 
H.263 video RTP, RFC 2435 for JPEG compressed video, and RFC 2250 for 
MPEG1/MPEG2 Video. 
 
Security 
In real world, VoIP systems may suffer many kinds of security threats. This is caused 
by the openness of VoIP implementations since most of the VoIP are operated on public 
accessible networks. The hackers may attack the calling server, invade the operating system, 
embed the virus in the VoIP telephone end points and even perform the DoS attacks to the 
signalling systems. In this thesis, we will only focus on the content safety of the multimedia 
data.  
The confidentiality of RTP can be implemented by means of encryption, and the 
encryption might be performed at the application level or at the IP level. Perkins analysed the 
advantages and disadvantages of the two options in his recently published book [2.8]. RTP 
standard does not provide integrity protection or source origin authentication for the 
packetized data by itself. The designers of RTP specification leave it blank on purpose, thus 
the different developers can implement the security methods in their needs. Most of the 
authentication implementation is with accordance to secure RTP [2.1] or with use of IPSec 
[2.2]. 
 
2.1.2.1 Security Methods in the RTP Specification 
The RTP specification [2.11] designs the encryption procedures. The deployed 
scheme encrypts RTP packet or RTCP packets. Since RTP packets and RTCP packets are 
processed on the top of IP layer, the encryption of the whole RTP or TRCP packets does not 
affect the routing and traffic of real-time multimedia data communications. The block 
encryption algorithms, i.e., DES-CBC [2.12], or stream ciphers are most commonly used. 
Both the transmitter and receiver share the same key and they need to negotiate to generate a 
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key before the start of the real-time data communication.  The distribution of the shared key 
relies on the key exchange protocols. Figure 2.4 illustrates an encrypted RTP data packet. The 
RTP data packet is encrypted on the application level of TCP/IP stacks.  
 
Figure 2.4: An Encrypted RTP Data Packet 
  
 DES-CBC is specified in both RTP specification and SRTP. Many VoIP systems 
being used presently are running on either a desktop or a notebook and thy implement the 
DES algorithm by a software module. DES is not robust enough by a software 
implementation, so the confidentiality specified by the RTP specification is vulnerable. In 
addition, the key distribution is also a point always to be attacked. RTP only authenticate the 
identification of participants, not the RTP data packet, thus RTP data packet is not difficult to 
be forged.  
 
2.1.2.2 SRTP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5:   Integrity and Confidentiality Mechanic of SRTP 
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To overcome the security weakness of RTP specification, SRTP [2.1] is proposed by 
IETF. In SRTP, the transmitter and receiver need to use a same encryption algorithm and 
share the same keys. SRTP supports both message integrity protection and source origin 
authentication.  
Source origin authentication can be achieved by means of message authentication 
code. TESLA (short for Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication) is a promising 
algorithm specified by IETF as RFC 4082 [2.6].   
The secure RTP specification describes the procedure generally as follow: 
1)  Data Encryption 
 Payload_Dataencrypted = DES( keyDES, Payload_Data ) 
2)  Hashing 
Authen_Tag = SHA( Payload_Dataencrypted ) 
Authentication 
As illustrated in Figure 2.5, message authentication code is used in SRTP to achieve 
the source origin authentication. The fragmented data is encrypted using DES algorithm and 
then an authentication code is generated by SHA algorithm over the whole data packet. Both 
the transmitter and receiver share a secret key to encrypt and authenticate the SRTP data 
packets.  
Confidentiality 
SRTP encrypts just the payload section of a RTP data packet to achieve the 
confidentiality, as shown in Figure 2.4. The specified encryption algorithm is DES-CBC 
[2.12]. The weakness of SRTP confidentiality solution is similar to the security method of 
RTP specification: the symmetric cipher based on software implementation is not robust 
enough.  
 
2.1.2.3 IPSec 
Authentication  
IPSec [2.2] and SSL are two well-known solutions for the purpose of VPN security. 
SSL works in the application level, while IPSec operates on the network level and works just 
under the TCP/IP protocol stacks. IPSec [2.2] is a protocol set to provide encryption, integrity 
and authentication for data packets. It consists of a set of cryptographic protocols and Internet 
Key Exchange protocol (IKE for short).  
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Figure 2.6: IPSec Architecture 
 
Authentication in IPSec is provided by the Encapsulating Security Payload profile, 
and it encrypts the payload data and UDP header, and appends an authentication header and a 
trailer. Authentication Header (AH) [2.7] is another implementation choice standardized by 
IETF earlier. The key difference is that the entire packet is authenticated, including the outer 
IP header. 
Confidentiality  
ESP [2.2] also supports confidentiality of data packets. ESP adds an additional header 
and trailer to each data packet. A security parameter index and a sequence number are 
inserted between IP header and the payload data, and an authentication code is appended at 
the tail.  
 
2.1.2.4 Fast Encryption Methods for Audiovisual Data Confidentiality 
The existing security approaches work in different levels/components in secure 
multimedia communication systems. Selective algorithm [2.3], ZIG-ZAG permutation [2.4] 
and Video Encryption Algorithm [2.5] incorporate cryptographic techniques with multimedia 
compression algorithm. They are working in the application level.  
Integrity and authenticity mechanisms of the existing security approaches have some 
drawbacks: they are not flexible enough to handle the distortion introduced during by 
communication; the receiver can retrieve the source multimedia data, and that may cause 
multimedia data abuse. 
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2.1.3 Drawbacks of Traditional Security Methods 
Real-time multimedia communications unveils some special properties stemming 
from both multimedia data and real-time communication. First, end users cannot perceive 
limited distortions in multimedia data, so, some bit errors and packets losses occurring during 
communication do not defect the overall visual/audio quality. Secondly, due to controlling 
protocols and implementations of real-time multimedia communication, packet losses may 
happen any time. Thirdly, caused by the large amount of multimedia data, the communication 
security trade-offs should be as low as possible. 
In the previous security methods, source origin authentication is achieved by hashing. 
However, hash function was originally developed as a solution to the integrity and 
authenticity problem for text messages. So, it does not take into consideration explicitly the 
special properties of multimedia data nor of real-time communication. The hashing is a one-
time security method, thus it does not have any correlation with timing. Thus, there are some 
serious drawbacks when one attempts to exploit these methods for the envisaged application.  
Firstly, hashing is sensitive to data distortion ― an unrecoverable bit error in the 
multimedia message or in the digital signature/MAC code may disable the corresponding 
authentication procedures.  
Secondly, in general, hashing-based authentication methods are facilitated on the 
checksums of message. These kinds of authentication methods append a pad at the tail of the 
multimedia data. The authentication pad is apart from the message itself. A possible attacker 
may discard the padding and record the multimedia contents only and then reuse this message 
again and again. The attackers can use the recorded voice to cheat the access control systems. 
In a scenario of multimedia news service or video on demand service, the attacks can record 
the contents of the TV programs or films, and resell the programs or films to the other 
customers for a profit.  
Thirdly, these techniques increase the latency of multimedia communication so that 
the handheld devices (such as PDAs and cellular phones) in general cannot meet the resulting 
computing power requirements. With the incoming age of 3G wireless communication, 
multimedia news service, video conferencing will be realized on hand held devices such as 
PDAs and cell phones. All these multimedia services consume very large data volume. To 
achieve the privacy, the symmetric methods can be used. But as to the confidentiality, the 
asymmetric schemes are absolutely needed. The heavy processing of the asymmetric schemes 
may outbreak the computation capacity of portal devices. Thus an alternative solution with a 
light computation requirement is in urgent need. 
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Fourthly, hashing-based authentication techniques do not have any timing wrapping. 
That means that a series of authentication codes do not have any connection with timing, and 
the authentication codes sequence is orderless. It is difficulty to perform the post 
authentication based on the authentication code sequence.  
 
Figure 2.7: Content Security in Real-Time Multimedia Communication 
 
 Figure 2.7 illustrates attacks to the content security of real-time multimedia 
communication. During the course of transmission, multimedia traffic is subject to packet loss 
and malicious attacks. The receiver assembles the incoming data packets to restore the whole 
multimedia message. But the assembly process only extracts the data payloads from the 
packets and discards the packet header / tails which may contain the authentication codes or 
timing information. Thus the saved multimedia data does not have any authentication code 
linked to it. Thus the received multimedia data is subject to the potential tampers or abuses.  
 The possible solution is to embed the timing information and authentication codes 
into the multimedia data thus that the assembly process cannot detaching timing and 
authentication codes from the multimedia data. In the proposed scheme, the transmitter inserts 
some watermarks into the data packets and the receiver can retrieve the digital watermarks 
during the transmission to verify the security of transmission. The other parties can extract the 
watermarks from the stored multimedia data and perform the integrity and source origin 
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authentications. The utmost requirement of the digital watermarking algorithm is to detect any 
alterations.  
 
2.2 A Watermarking Framework for Real-time Multimedia Communication 
Some researchers [2.9] model the digital watermarking as a kind of communication 
problem. The technique of digital watermarking can be viewed as modulating a weak noise 
with a strong signal. If the noise is below a predefined threshold (HVS is a threshold for 
image watermarking and HAS is a reference measurement for audio watermarking), the 
distortion introduced by digital watermark can not be noticed by the person.   
A typical watermarking framework is first proposed by I. Cox [2.9], as illustrated in 
Figure 2.8. A watermark embedder inserts a digital watermark, w, to an original digital media, 
Do. The watermarked media, D1, should be perceptually identical to the original. The 
watermarked media may suffer various kinds of attacks during the distribution or 
transmission. A watermark detector extracts the hidden data, w’, from the received copy, D2. 
The digital watermark may be a message, an image or a video clip. The model is originated 
from the well known communication model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8: General framework of data hiding systems 
 
2.2.1 Outline 
Digital watermarking provides an alternative approach to ensure the safety of 
multimedia data during transmission in openly accessible channels. The digital watermarks 
may be embedded into the multimedia data to assure its integrity and authenticity without 
degrading the overall quality of the transmitted data.  
Figure 2.9 shows the outline of a security mechanism using digital watermarks.  
Digital watermarking operates on the multimedia data to hide/extract information. This makes 
this approach different to most of the current cryptography mechanisms.  
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When inspecting the integrity and authenticity of the transmitted multimedia data, 
some special characteristics are to be taken into account - both the amount of the multimedia 
data and the occurrences of packet loss as well as of bit errors are unpredictable. Since the 
receiver can only receive the unpredictable multimedia data, we need an independent 
reference in order to verify the integrity and authenticity of the dynamic multimedia data 
during transmission. In the proposed approach, the sender and receiver share one reference 
watermark, w1, from an independent trustworthy party before the multimedia data 
transmission really starts. To provide the non-repudiate and authenticity, a secret digital 
watermark, w2, is being introduced. w2 has previously been encrypted with a public key 
algorithm, e.g., RSA.  
The sender embeds both a public, w1, and a secret watermark, w2, into the outgoing 
multimedia data stream. The receiver then extracts the public digital watermark, w1’, from its 
incoming stream and compare w1’ with w1 to determine the security of the session. The secret 
watermark, w2, can be used for the purpose of source origin authentication. This scheme 
provides an integrated solution to secure multimedia communication and multimedia data 
integrity.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Secure Real-time Communication with Digital Watermarking 
The network transportation path can be viewed as a noisy channel. The reference 
digital watermark is modulated with multimedia data (carrier) and transmitted onto the noisy 
channel. The watermark undergoes the same changes suffered by the multimedia data, so that 
the watermark degradation can be used to estimate the overall alterations of the multimedia 
data caused by noise or by attacks.  At the receiver side the embedded digital watermark is 
extracted and compared to the original reference watermark in order to measure the integrity 
and authenticity of the received multimedia data. It is obvious that the proposed framework 
integrate the timing mechanism to the multimedia data naturally.  
 
We can compare the proposed scheme with the traditional real-time multimedia 
authentication scheme, as shown in Figure 2.10. On the transmitter’s side, in traditional 
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authentication scheme, the timing information is included in the RTP header and the source 
origin information is included in the appended authentication code. While in the proposed 
scheme, the timing information and source origin information are integrated into the digital 
watermark.  
In the traditional scheme, the receiver extracts the data payload from the RTP data 
packet, and assembles multiple data payloads to form the recorded multimedia data. Since the 
RTP header and the appended authentication tag have been discarded, the assembled 
multimedia data does not contain timing information and source origin information any more. 
Appending a padding including the timing and source information would be a potential 
solution. However, the padding is independent of the protected multimedia data thus the 
saved multimedia data may be abused or attacked. The process of padding generation is also 
not trustable.  
In the proposed scheme, the transmitter embeds the digital watermark into the data 
payload. By careful design, the receiver cannot eliminate the embedded watermark. The saved 
multimedia data contains the timing information and source origin information by itself. The 
watermark embedding and extraction are performed in the application layer, so the traditional 
security methods also can be employed to protect the real time communications. 
 
Figure 2.10: Secure Real-time Communication with Digital Watermarking 
Application 
Layer 
Application 
Layer 
  
  
Payload Data Auth Header 
  
  
  
Payload Data Auth Header 
  
Saved Data 
Payload Data 
  
  
Payload Data + W A H 
  
  
  
  
Saved Data 
Payload Data + W A H 
Payload Data + W 
Post Authentication 
Timing, Source Origin  
Padding 
 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Layered structure of a data hiding system in real-time multimedia system 
 
A layered structure of the proposed security framework using digital watermarking 
technique is illustrated in Figure 2.11. The “Watermark Operation” embeds watermark bits in 
the host signal or extracts watermark bit from the watermarked data. The “Transmission 
Layer” deals with the packet loss which may occur during the transmission and the bit error 
for stored media. The “Security Infrastructure” provides the traditional cryptographic service 
for the framework, and it may be implemented by SSL. The cryptographic service includes 
secure channel management and digital certificate authentication. The “Content Security” 
handles the security of the whole multimedia session to protect multimedia data from reuse 
and abuse. The “Application Layer” extends the content security, and one potential 
application is “Voice Cheque” presented in Chapter 6.   
 
2.2.2 Unique ID and Transaction ID Assignment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 2.12:  Linking a unique Certificate to each Device 
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In our work, each front-end device (fingerprint scanner, cellular phone or Internet 
telephone) needs a mechanism to link itself to a unique identifier, DCert, for authentication 
purposes.  
A digital certificate is a means to authenticate identity. A certification authority (CA) 
usually utilizes a public key infrastructure (PKI) to generate, authenticate and manage the 
digital certificates. A digital certificate is usually issued by a trusted third party (CA) to bind 
an entity to a public key. The digital certificate is signed by the CA with the CA's private key. 
This provides independent confirmation of an entity.  
SSL is being used in the proposed approach to generate the required unique 
identifiers. At start, a device combines some information such as its name, IP address, 
telephone number, and email address to generate a digital certificate request. Then the device 
posts the digital certificate request to a register authority (RA). The RA verifies the incoming 
request and forwards it to a certificate authority (CA). The CA issues a digital certificate and 
sends then back the certificate to the applying device. In addition, it stores the issued digital 
certificate into the certificate directory.  
A kind of transaction certificates denoted transCerts are assigned to each 
conversation in order to uniquely identify a transaction. A transaction server denoted as 
transServer generates the transCerts, and distributes them to the participating front-end 
devices, i.e. fingerprint scanner, cellular phones or voice over IP partners, respectively. 
The generation of a transCert is illustrated in Figure.2.13. In its simplest form, a 
transCert would include the identifier of the individual/entity, timestamp, serial number for 
the certificate, and the individuals' or entities' public key. Most importantly, it would be 
digitally signed by the issuing transServer using the transServer's private key. A transCert 
could contain other information as well. Depending on the type of certificate, it could include 
information on access privileges, geographic location of the owner, or the age of the owner.  
First, transServer generates a message packet consisting of a timestamp, identifiers of 
participants, transaction number, and a random number. Secondly, transServer signs the 
message packet using a public-key encryption algorithm to create a secret watermark, denoted 
as w2. Third, transServer creates a key and a public watermark, denoted as w1, respectively. 
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Figure 2.13: An Illustration of transCert Generation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.14: Real-Time Authentication for VoIP 
 
Once the participants receive the transCerts from transServer, the conversation may 
begin. At first, they authenticate the received transaction certificate. If the authentication is 
successful, then the participants parse the received transCerts to ((w2, key) w1) and insert then 
the digital watermarks into their outgoing audio data streams. At the same time, both 
participants extract the w1’ from their incoming streams and authenticate them, as depicted in 
Figure 2.14. At the end of the transmission, i.e., conversation, each of the participants sends a 
dialog_end request to transServer. transServer authenticates the received dialog_end request 
and puts them on file. 
 
2.2.3 transServer 
transServer has a facility of CA. The certificates, transCerts and DCerts are digitally 
signed by transServer providing independent confirmation that entities or transactions are in 
fact who they claim to be and that the public key provided by them does in fact belong to that 
party. The transServer's public key is widely known so that there is no need to authenticate 
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transServer's digital signature. Each devices or end user is relying on the transServer's digital 
signature to authenticate the certificate owner's identity and to bind that identity to their own 
public key. The procedure can be formulated as: 
answer ← Digital_Cert_Authentication( transCert or DCert, public key ) 
 
2.2.4 Source Origin Authentication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.15: Source Origin Authentication 
 
The digital watermarks embedded in the multimedia messages have been signed 
using public-key encryption.  This means that each of the watermarked multimedia data is 
distinguishable from others.  Therefore, one can verify the source origin of the saved 
multimedia data as follows:  
1) parse a transCert to extract the proper digital watermark, w  
(w, key) ← Parse( transCert ) 
2) extract a digital watermark, w’, from the recorded multimedia data  
w’ ← Extract(data, key ) 
3) compare it with the original one to authenticate the inspected multimedia data.  
 answer ← (w ≡ w’:?) 
 
Post authentication as illustrated in Figure 2.15 is intended to be used by anyone. A 
suspected image can be authenticated by assessing the similarity between, w’, the embedded 
watermark and, w, reference watermark. 
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Since w has initially been signed by means of the RSA private key of the 
authentication server, transServer, the validation of w can be authenticated by applying a 
RSA encryption operation with use of transServer’s RSA public key. The process can be 
formulated as: 
answer ← RSA_Authentication(Server’s public key, transCert  ) 
Post authentication is performed by some auxiliary tools denoted as 
MM_Authenticator and WM_Validator, respectively. MM_Authenticator extracts the digital 
watermark, w’, from the watermarked multimedia data and then compares it to the original 
watermark, w, in order to make an assessment of authenticity. In contrast, WM_Validator is 
used to authenticate the author of w. Anyone can use these tools in order to authenticate 
suspected multimedia data and w. Finally, one characteristic property of the proposed 
approach should be mentioned - both w and transServer’s public RSA key are accessible to 
anybody. So, both image and watermark authentications are public. 
 
Post authentication is widely used in E-commerce and email systems. In e-commerce, 
the post authentication enables the participators of the e-transaction to validate the data sheet 
after the transaction; in email system, the post authentication can verify the source origin and 
integrity of the text or multimedia message. For real-time multimedia systems, the proposed 
post authentication scheme can verify the source origin, integrity, timing and source origin of 
the real time multimedia data. This can enable the e-commerce applications with more natural 
human computer interfaces by replacing the text-based data sheet with multimedia data such 
as speech or video. Chapter 6 introduces a possible e-commerce application scenario.  
 
2.2.5 Application Areas 
In this work, some security mechanisms are exploited, which rely on authentication 
rather than on encryption methods. The highly asymmetric architectures found in ubiquitous 
computing applications are exploited to provide a protection of the transmitted multimedia 
data by means of well-known digital watermarking techniques. The advocated approach 
adopts public key encryption to efficiently generate non-repudiate multimedia data, whereas 
both the digital watermark generation and the authentication algorithms are public. In 
addition, this approach to real-time multimedia data authentication is independent of specific 
network properties, so it may easily be exploited for heterogeneous communication networks.  
With the use of the proposed integrity and authenticity mechanisms, we link some useful 
information to the multimedia data and as well can detect any tampers occurred on it. The 
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proposed security scheme can be applied in different scenarios such as deploying static image 
watermarking techniques in multimedia collection and applying audio watermarking 
techniques in e-commerce scenarios. 
To prove the evidence of the proposed scheme, a prototype for secure digital image 
communication has been implemented. An improved image watermarking algorithm is 
exploited to embed digital watermark into image DWT coefficients.  
In addition, another prototype for secure speech communication has been developed 
and implemented. The prototype architecture consists of a pair of IP phones and a transServer 
which is a software module running on a powerful computer with a RSA facility. A new 
fragile speech watermarking algorithm incorporating with GSM 610 full-rate voice encoder is 
deployed to detect the tampers. 
 
Applying Digital Watermarking Techniques for Secure Image Capture 
Front-ends of image collection systems are in general to be implemented by means of 
low-cost, low-resource devices. Since this kind of devices embedded into the authentication 
application feature in most cases a weak computation power only, a straight forward security 
policies such as encryption is not a good choice. We exploited digital image watermarking 
technique to this asymmetric computing architecture.  
At the front-end´s side, the complete image is first divided into a sequence of images 
clips { I0, I1, I2, …, IM }. The digital watermark, W, can also be structured into a sequence of 
sub-watermarks, { W0, W1, W2,…, WM }. Each sub-watermark is then to be inserted into the 
corresponding image clip in order to create a watermarked clip. Then the watermarked image 
clips are sequentially transmitted to the server, which is in charge of image reconstruction and 
of digital watermark authentication. Finally, the watermark detector of the server extracts a 
sequence of sub-watermarks denoted as { W0’, W1’,…, WM’ } from the received set of marked 
image clips and decides on the authenticity of the transmitted image. In order to ensure the 
overall safety of the communication, real-time authentication is employed during the 
transmission. In the beginning of each transmission cycle, Watermark Embedder on front-end 
inserts a digital watermark, Wi, into the i-th clip of the original image, and then the 
watermarked clip is sent to Server. As soon as Server receives the watermarked image clip, it 
extracts the embedded watermark, Wi’, immediately. Server compares the extracted 
watermark W’ with the original one, W. If Wi’ does not differ from Wi, then the received 
image clips are composed into the authentified final image. After accepting all watermarked 
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image clips, WM_Server reconstructs the full image and checks the authenticity of the 
received image.  
The image watermarking procedure used here is operated in Wavelet Domain.  Since 
DWT is very suitable for low-end chips, the image clip is transformed into wavelet frequency 
domain first, and then some coefficients are modified slightly to embed the digital watermark 
into it. 
 
Applying Digital Watermarking Techniques for Secure VoIP 
VoIP or Internet telephony is a technology allows people to perform telephone 
service using the existing IP-based data network, thus it can avoid the tolls charged by 
telephone service provider. However, lot of security incidents occurred in the last years and 
their number is still increasing. Therefore, security is a demanding topic for VoIP telephony 
systems. 
There are five different categories of security services present for IP telephony: 
Identification and authentication, Authorization, Confidentiality, Integrity, Non-denial/Non-
repudiation. These security aspects can be provided by means of different cryptographic 
techniques such as secret key cryptography, public key cryptography, and hash functions, 
respectively. In this thesis, we mainly address integrity and source origin authentication of 
multimedia data. By multimedia data integrity and authenticity mechanisms, we can provide 
some very useful related information, such as the speaker identity, the point in time when 
dialog happened, and the integrity/authenticity of the transaction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16:   Application in Real-Time Speech Communication  
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watermark, speech_watermark. In contrast, a comm_watermark will be inserted into the 
speech message to ensure the authenticity and integrity of real-time speech transmission. Both 
digital watermarks and private keys are binary sequences. 
This proposed scheme has several advantage and is suitable for real-time multimedia 
communication: 1, the proposed scheme is robust to packet loss and delays; 2, the 
watermarking procedure is lighter than encryption; 3, the proposed scheme provides integrity 
and authenticity functionality for the whole multimedia message instead of single data packet; 
4, adopts public key encryption to efficiently generate non-repudiate multimedia data. In 
addition, this approach to real-time multimedia data authentication is independent of specific 
network properties, so it may easily be exploited for heterogeneous communication networks.  
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Chapter 3  A Digital Watermarking-Based Image Authentication Scheme for 
Distributed Embedded Systems 
 
 
This chapter outlines a novel approach to extending well-known digital watermarking 
techniques to the protection of image data during the network transmission within distributed 
highly asymmetric system architectures. An incremental watermarking algorithm suitable for 
low-resource embedded systems to be used in distributed environments is presented. The 
proposed watermarked image authentication scheme is public; its safety depends on the 
robustness of the underlying RSA algorithm. The main advantages of this approach are 
demonstrated by some use cases. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The upcoming information processing architectures for ubiquitous computing is 
highly sensitive to security issues. For some networked scenarios, such as fingerprint 
collection in distributed environment, video monitoring and health care systems, the image 
integrity and authenticity is fatal to the success of these services. While most of the embedded 
systems working in such distributed environments are low-end devices in terms of their 
computing power, memory size, and communication bandwidths. Therefore, new security 
policies have to provide such that the given constraints of these devices are considered 
accordingly.  
When inspecting the security of real-time multimedia communication, one should 
take into account the special properties of both multimedia data and real-time communication. 
First, the limited distortions in multimedia do not disturb the end users or degrade the 
performance of biometric recognition systems. Second, packet loss and bit errors may always 
happen, especially for wireless connection. Third, due to the large amount of multimedia data, 
the communication security trade-offs should be low enough.  
The existing integrity and authenticity approaches such as MAC (Message 
Authentication Code) have some drawbacks: first, they are sensitive to data distortion ― an 
unrecoverable bit error in the multimedia message or the possible packet loss in real-time 
multimedia transmission may disable the corresponding authentication procedures; second, 
digital digest/MAC is apart from the message itself and this may cause multimedia data 
abuse; third, these techniques are packet-based such that not applicable to the continuous 
multimedia. 
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To overcome the drawbacks of existing solutions, some new security mechanisms 
using digital watermarking [3.1-3.7] techniques are proposed, which rely on authentication 
rather than on encryption methods. In this chapter, we report our work on applying digital 
watermarking techniques to enhance the security of image transmission. The main 
contributions outlined in the following are an incremental approach to watermark generation 
and a secure software architecture suited for highly asymmetric distributed identification 
systems.  
 
3.2 Fragile Image Watermarking 
3.2.1 Wavelet Method 
Wavelet theory [3.18] provides a method to analyze and represents signals in time for 
its frequency contents. Wavelets are localized waves. A “mother function” or “wavelet basis”, 
Ψ(t), is defined first. Then one can scale and translate the mother wavelet [3.18] to obtain a 
family of other wavelets, which can be defined as 
 
 
where, a locates the position of the wavelet and b indicates the width of wavelet. In a wavelet 
transform, any finite energy signal can be represented by a linear combination of wavelets 
Ψ(a,b)(t).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Scale     2 Scales 
Figure 3.1: A Two Layered Wavelet Transformation 
 
Since P. Goupillaud and J. Morlet [3.22] introduced the technology as a mathematical 
tool in 1980s, wavelet theory has been widely applied in physics and mathematics. In the last 
fifteen years, the technology is quickly adopted in image or video processing. The 2-D 
wavelet transform [3.18] is the basis for image processing. It can be achieved by performing 
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the 1-D DWT separately on rows and columns of an image. The 2-D wavelet transform 
produces four sub-bands, namely LL, LH, HL and HH. The LL sub-band represents the 
original signal in half resolution and contains smooth spatial data. The HH sub-band consists 
of noise and the edges in the image. Most of the image energy is concentrated in the LL sub-
band. By applying the 2-D transform to the LL sub-band of the current scale repeatedly, a 
hierarchy tree of wavelet coefficients can be obtained. The benefit of wavelet transform lies in 
fitting in human visual system quite well. For the wavelet tree representation, the skeleton of 
an image has a low frequency, while the details have a high frequency. Since the digital 
watermarking must restore the image or audio after embedding signatures into the 
coefficients, only the wavelets with the property of reconstruction-able and discrete 
transformation can be used in watermarking. The commonly-used wavelets include: Meyer 
wavelet, Haar wavelet, Daubechies Wavelets, Symlets, Coiflets, Biorthogonal wavelets 
[3.19]. 
Usually the watermark embedding stage is invoked after DWT and quantization, and 
prior to entropy coding. Authentication is carried out in a reverse manner. In this work, the 
‘Daubechies db1’ wavelet base is used for DWT. Since DWT is very suitable for low-end 
chips, the image clip is transformed into wavelet frequency domain first, and then some 
coefficients are modified slightly to embed the digital watermark into it.    
 
3.2.2 A Fragile Image Watermarking Algorithm 
 
More and more digital images appear on the web pages and portal storages. The 
copyright piracy and image abuses become a serious problem. In order to protect the 
copyright or authenticate the credibility, digital watermarking techniques grow very fast. The 
digital watermarking can be applied on audio, image, or video. The watermarking algorithms 
can be generally categorized into two kinds: robust watermarking and fragile watermarking. 
The goal of robust watermarking algorithms [3.8- 3.10] is to remain the embedded 
digital watermarks even after some attacks. The attacks include the malicious modifications, 
i.e., averaging and watermark removal/counterfeit, and unintended processing, i.e., resizing, 
compression, and filtering. Robust watermarking algorithms are developed on the purpose of 
copyright protection and ownership identification.  
Fragile watermarking algorithms are very sensitive to the image processing. The 
broken digital watermarks indicate the alteration of the suspected image. Fragile 
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watermarking can operate in spatial domain or frequency domain. The spatial domain fragile 
watermarking algorithms [3.11, 3.12 - 15] modulate the least significant bit of the image 
pixels to embed a watermark bit. And the spatial domain watermarking algorithms are 
sensitive to the image compression and processing.  
DCT, DFT and DWT are the most popular transforms where the frequency domain 
fragile watermarking algorithms work. In frequency domain, these transforms can separate 
the coefficients of digital into different priorities with accordance to human perception 
systems. I. Cox in his paper [2.9] pointed out that the watermarks should be added on the 
lowest frequency coefficients in order to ensure the enough robustness. His idea is that image 
processing operations dare not to distort the lowest frequency severely. Some other 
researchers do not agree with his thought and they claimed that the distortion introduced to 
the low frequency domain may degrade the quality of the image severely. The basic idea of 
some algorithms [3.11, 3.16, 3.17] is to only watermark some of the mid-frequency 
coefficients and leave the most significant ones unmodified. This introduces only minor 
distortion to the original images and compromising the high visual quality of the images.  
In this work, we take Cox’s idea. For fragile watermarking algorithms, the slight 
alteration does not degrade the quality of image dramatically. To assure robustness, the 
watermark bit sequence is etched into the low-frequency coefficients of the image in wavelet 
domain, as illustrated in Figure. 3.2.  
Quantization [3.20] methods have been deployed in watermarking algorithms [3.21] 
for a long time. The basic idea is to quantize a sample, k, and use the distance between the 
new value with the old value to reveal the embedded message. The sample, k, is firstly 
quantized to a predefined value, and then k is added or subtracted by d/4, according to the 
value of watermark, to form a new value, here d is the quantization step.  
To illustrate it clearly, a process is outlined as follows: 
Quantization (k, m) 
{ 
if   m ≡ 0 
k’ ← q(k, d)+d/4 
else 
k’ ← q(k, d)-d/4 
} 
where d is a predefined quantization step. The sample is quantized as follows: 
q(k, d) = floor(k/d)* d  
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After q(*), k is quantized to a predefined value, and then k is added or subtracted to form a 
new value. The operation of addition or subtraction depends on the value of the watermark 
bit. 
The detection process works as follows: 
Detection (k’) 
{ 
if 0< k'-q(k, d) < d/4 
m ← 0 
else if -d/4 < k'-q(k, d) < 0 
m ← 1 
 } 
 
The watermarking algorithm works in the low frequency wavelet coefficients of an 
image. The discrete wavelet transform is commonly used in image processing, including 
digital watermarking. Embedding digital watermark in the low frequency is also commonly 
deployed. 
 
Xie’s Algorithm 
The watermark embedding and extraction algorithm is adapted from Xie’s work [3.2]. 
The original goal of her algorithm is for authentication instead of watermarking. The 
watermark embedding process of Xie’s algorithm works as follows: 
1) An image is transformed into a wavelet tree presentation 
2) In the lowest frequency domain, a window runs from top to bottom, and line by 
line. The running window selects a triple pair each time 
3) Quantize the middle element of the triple pair 
4) Restore the wavelet tree to the space domain 
 
 The novelty of Xie’s algorithm is that the quantization step is set to d/20 (step 3), 
where d is the distance between the largest element with the smallest element. By such 
excellent design, the distortion introduced by watermarking is so small that the watermarking 
process can be performed in the lowest frequency domain. The extraction process is similar to 
embedding except for substituting step 3 with Detection function as mentioned above. 
 
Improvement 
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Since a fingerprint or an iris image is sparse image and many small blocks of the 
fingerprint image is blank. Quantizing a triple pair, whose values are nearly same, is 
nonsense. So in this work, the triple pair is screened, and the triple pairs having nearly same 
values are skipped. Xie’s algorithm treats each pixel equally, thus can not be used for the 
purpose of watermarking. The modified algorithm avoids embedding watermark into the 
unstable regions.  
The screen process works as follows: 
1) Sort the triple pair 
2) d ← largest – smallest 
3) if  d < largest/10 
jump to the next triple pair 
else Embedding 
  
The modification of the embedding process can increase performance of the detection process 
dramatically.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The Watermark Engraving Structure 
 
The message containing timestamp and the secret key for this transaction are 
performed an XOR operation to generate the digital watermark. To further improve the 
performance of the watermarking algorithm, the watermark is modulated using Walsh code. 
That extends the power of watermark.  
The improved watermarking algorithm presented here is already robust enough for 
the purpose of copyright protection. Some natural images have been tested to prove this.  
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3.3 Watermarking Algorithm 
3.3.1 Principles of Progressive Watermarking 
Digital watermarking is a generic method to stamp images in such a way that the 
original image may clearly be identified from some information hided into the data. Of course, 
this additional information should not be removable by some attacker. When applying this 
technique to identification applications in a distributed environment, the sender of the image 
has to insert watermarks in such a way that its unique receiver may easily decide whether the 
image originates from this specific sender. In addition, the correct watermark guarantees the 
secure transmission of the information via public networks. The general model for 
watermarking technology can thus be represented as 
I’ = I + W     (3.4) 
Here, I’ is the watermarked image, I is the original host image, and denotes W as the digital 
watermark inserted to I. 
In this scheme, the complete image is first watermarked by the front-end device. It is 
then transmitted to the receiver, e.g., a server at the headquarters. The server subsequently 
extracts the embedded digital watermark to authenticate the received image.  
Several objectives should be addressed when developing watermarking technology 
for low-end devices communication over public networks: 1) the watermarking procedure 
should be of a light-weighted computation; 2) the energy of the additive watermarks should 
be low enough to maintain the visual quality of the images. 
The proposed approach to a secure transmission of images takes these objectives into 
account. It thus ensures a secure transmission, it requires a very low computing power of the 
front-end device, and it exploits public authentication techniques. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3:    Watermarking System Based on the Progressive Transmission 
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We subdivide the original image I into a sequence of images clips { I0, I1, I2, …, IM }. 
The total watermark W can also be structured into a sequence of sub-watermarks, { W0, W1, 
W2,…, WM }. Each sub-watermark is then to be inserted into the corresponding image clip in 
order to create a watermarked clip. Thus, (3.4) can be rewritten as 
Ik’ = Ik + Wk,  0 ≤ k ≤ M    (3.5) 
This means that a sequence of sub-watermarks can be embedded into a series of image clips. 
Then the watermarked image clips are sequentially transmitted to the server, which is in 
charge of image reconstruction and of digital watermark authentication. Finally, the 
watermark detector of the server extracts a sequence of sub-watermarks denoted as { W0’, 
W1’, W2’,…, WM’ } from the received set of marked image clips and decides on the 
authenticity of the transmitted image. This progressive watermarking method is depicted in 
Figure 3.3. 
 
3.3.2 Architecture of Progressive Watermarking 
The progressive watermarking approach outlined above has to consider the highly 
asymmetric properties of the envisaged distributed authentication system architecture in terms 
of computing power and memory space. We therefore assign all the heavy computational 
tasks of watermark generation and authentication checks to the back-end device, i.e., the 
server. This results in a transaction based, recurrent communication scheme as outlined in 
Figure 3.4. We focus on the watermark generation, insertion, and validation first. 
WM_Server and WM_Sender are introduced for this purpose. WM_Server is a 
software module running on a powerful computer acting as the server of the distributed client-
server architecture, and it has a RSA facility. This server is in charge of the watermark 
generation and of security issues. WM_Sender is a software module running on the front-end 
device acting as the client. This device consists in general of an embedded system featuring a 
low to medium performance micro-controller or of a low-end configurable system-on-chip 
such as Atmel AT94K FPSLIC family, respectively, and of an image generator. In case of an 
ATM banking application scenario, the front-end device produces the customer’s fingerprint 
image from sensor data or her or his eye iris image by means of a camera, then it inserts 
watermarks to the scanned image and transmits the enhanced image to the central server 
according to the sequential procedure outlined in Figure 3.4.  
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3.3.3 Trustable End Device 
A trustable WM_Sender is crucial to the security and robustness of the whole system. 
In order to ensure the trustability of WM_Sender, the WM_Server generates a message M 
based on pseudo-noise during the initialisation of the system, and signs this message as to get 
a unique signature which, in turn, is assigned to TransSig. The RSA private key of 
WM_Server is exploited for this purpose. WM_Sender then uses TransSig as its stream 
cipher’s key for the entire transaction. 
3.3.4 Transaction 
A transaction denotes the procedure of image collection, of watermarking, of image 
transmission, and of image authentication. It consists of a sequence of interactions between 
WM_Sender and WM_Server. Each transaction has a unique signature denoted as TransSig. A 
cycle defines the manipulation and the subsequent transmission of one image clip only. Thus, 
a transaction embodies several cycles depending on the size of both the entire image and the 
size of a single clip. The interaction of WM_Sender and WM_Server during a transaction is 
detailed in Figure. 3.4. 
At the beginning of the transaction, WM_Server creates a message sequence  { M0,  
M1,  M2,……., Mm} based on random pseudo-noise data, and signs this message M by 
encrypting it with the RSA private key. Upon completion, WM_Server sends the encrypted 
message sequence denoted as { eM0, eM1, eM2,…, eMm } to WM_Sender one by one during the 
transaction. 
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At WM_Sender’s side, one piece of message, eMi, is received and then signed by  
TransSig. Later on, WM_Sender generates a series of digital sub-watermarks. The image is 
first subdivided into several clips. Then, the watermark embedder on WM_Sender inserts one 
sub-watermark into the associated image clip. The watermarked image clip is sent to the 
WM_Server immediately. WM_Sender repeats all these operations until all image clips have 
been sent out. 
 After accepting all watermarked image clips, WM_Server reconstructs the full image 
and checks the authenticity of the received image as follows. 
3.3.5 Generation of Digital Watermark 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5:    Digital Watermark Generation 
 
The watermark generator within WM_Server produces pseudo-noise data consisting 
of 100 key words. This key sequence is then signed by applying RSA encryption with the 
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private key of WM_Server. This module forwards the encrypted message sequence eM to 
WM_Sender as outlined in Figure 3.5. 
Once eM is received by WM_Sender then its stream cipher signs it using TransSig in 
order to create the final digital sub-watermark which, in turn, is inserted by WM_Embedder 
into the coefficients sequence of the image clip at hand as depicted in Figure 3.6.  
3.3.6 Authentication 
The authentication of an image is addressed in two ways by the proposed approach to 
progressive watermarking – real-time authentication and post authentication.   
3.3.6.1 Real-time Authentication 
In order to ensure the overall safety of the communication, real-time authentication is 
employed during the transmission. In the beginning of each cycle, WM_Sender generates a 
digital watermark, wi, using stream cipher, TransSig as the key. wi is inserted into the i-th clip 
of the original image, and then the watermarked clip is sent to WM_Server.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6:    Real-Time Authentication 
 
As soon as WM_Server receives the watermarked image clip, it extracts the 
embedded watermark, wi’, immediately. Since WM_Server holds the signature for each 
transaction, TransSig, it can sign the encrypted message sequence eM using it, to re-construct 
the same sub-watermark WM_Sender embedded previously in the image clip. WM_Server 
then compares the complete extracted watermark W’ with the original one, w. If w’ does not 
differ from w, then the received image clips are composed into the authentified final image.  
Finally, WM_Server generates the public_WM by selecting a part of the full 
watermark sequences. Later on, public_WM is published.  
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3.3.6.2 Post Authentication 
Post authentication as illustrated in Figure 3.7 is intended to be used by anyone. A 
suspected image can be authenticated by assessing the similarity between the embedded 
watermark and public_WM.  
Since public_WM has initially been signed by means of the RSA private key of 
WM_Server, the validation of public_WM can be authenticated too by decrypting public_WM 
using TransSig (by stream cipher) and by applying a RSA encryption operation exploiting 
WM_Server’s RSA public key. Post authentication is performed by some auxiliary tools 
denoted as Image_Authenticator and WM_Validator, respectively. Image_Authenticator 
extracts the digital watermark from the watermarked image and then compares it to the public 
key public_WM  in order to make an assessment of authenticity. In contrast, WM_Validator is 
used to authenticate the author of public_WM. Everyone can use these tools in order to 
authenticate suspected images and public_WMs. Finally, one characteristic property of the 
proposed approach should be mentioned - both public_WM and WM_Server’s public RSA key 
are accessible to anybody. So, both image and watermark authentications are public. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Post Authentication 
 
3.4. Analysis of Workload 
 The workload on WM_Server consists of management and detection tasks of digital 
watermarks. In contrast, the workload on WM_Sender deals with watermark management and 
embedding. When looking more into the details of watermark management on the 
WM_Server side, the tasks of watermark generation, of RSA encryption, and of stream cipher 
WM_Server 
Watermark 
public_WM 
Watermark Validator 
Image Authenticator 
Watermarked 
Image 
Is public_WM 
valid ? 
Is this image 
valid ? 
Selection 
RSA  
Public Key 
 41 
encryption have to be executed.  The watermark management on WM_Sender side consists of 
stream cipher encryption.  
 In our scheme, the watermark embedder of WM_Sender takes the same computation 
load as the watermark detector of WM_Server does. The difference of workload, τ, between 
the workloads of WM_Sender and of WM_Server reads as follows 
 τ = τserver–τsender  
     = (τsvr_wm+τdetection)–(τsender_wm+τembedding) 
     = τsvr_wm  – τsender_wm  
    = (τPN-generation + τrsa   + τwm_gen ) – (τwm-gen )  
    = τPN-generation + τrsa                                                                                                                                        (3.6) 
 Therefore,   τ ≈ τrsa     >>   τsender                                                                                                        (3.7)  
From (3.7) it is obvious that the workload on WM_Server is far heavier than that on 
WM_Sender. The proposed progressive watermarking approach considers the in general 
highly asymmetric properties of distributed authentication architectures in an appropriate way. 
3.5 Experimental Results 
 The outlined approach to progressive watermarking has been implemented as a 
prototype. It consists of three software packages, namely WM_Sender, WM_Server, and 
Post_Authentication_Tool as outlined in Figure 3.8: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8:    Software Components of Progressive Watermarking 
 
• WM_Sender decomposes the original image into clips, inserts digital watermarks into 
their DWT coefficients, and then sends them to WM_Server. 
• WM_Server generates digital watermarks, receives the watermarked images clips, 
and extracts the embedded marks. In addition, it is responsible for the recording of the 
complete digital watermark and the entire image, 
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M-1               M-1 
∑ ( Wj × Wj )  ∑ (Wj ‘× Wj’ ) 
j = 0              j = 0 
• Post Authentication Tools can be used by everyone to verify the validity of public-
WMs and to authenticate suspected images. 
 
Several publicly available images were used to test the performance of this system. 
 
 
 
3.5.1 Visual Effects of Watermarked Images 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9:   High-Qualified Watermarked Images 
 
Figure 3.9 shows the high-qualified watermarked images, and it is difficult to find the 
visual difference between original images and watermarked images by inspection only.  
 
3.5.2 Post Authentication 
The verification of the suspected image is performed by using Image_Authenticator. 
It first extracts the suspected watermark from the suspected image, and computes the 
correlation as follow: 
       
               
Correlation =                     (3.8) 
                                      √   
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                                          one with the original   
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Table 3.1: Correlation 
 
PSNR: Peak Signal to Noise Rate 
From the table above, we know Image_Authenticator can distinguish the watermarked images 
from images without the correct digital watermarks. The WM_Validator detects any changes 
on the public watermarks, even a very slight modification.  
3.5.3 Overhead Introduced by Proposed Scheme 
Table 3.2: Overhead Introduced by Proposed Scheme 
 
WM_Server WM_Server (without RSA operation) WM_Sender 
Time          in second 161.34 10.21 10.23 
Overhead   in second 151.21 0.1039 0.1053 
Overhead/Time 93.72% 1.02% 1.03% 
All results from our prototype run on Pentium 3 700 MHz processor under Linux 
In our experiment, a pair of 43-byte-length RSA keys was used. The table above 
shows the overhead introduced by our scheme. It is clear that WM_Server spends quite a lot 
of computation time on digital watermark generation and the workload of WM_Server is far 
heavier than that of WM_Sender.  
3.6  Conclusion 
 This proposed scheme has several advantages and is suitable for real-time image 
collection: The architecture of the proposed scheme is asymmetric, WM_Server’s 
computation task is heavy, while WM_Sender’s computation task is rather light. In addition, 
the image authentication is public, and a verification of public watermarks is also public. 
System-on-chip technology provides a very convenient platform for low-end embedded 
devices. We are working towards an implementation of the client as an embedded system by 
means of a configurable SoC device. 
 
 
 
Correlation 
(image without the digital watermark) 
Correlation  
(watermarked image) 
PSNR 
Fingerprint 0.363892 0.865455 41.448132 
Lena 0.402415 0.929432 42.124886 
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Chapter 4  Authentication Methods for Speech  
 
 
There are two kinds of security mechanisms, feature-based digital signature and 
speech watermarking, can be exploited for the purpose of integrity and confidentiality. 
Feature-based digital signature, which is similar to the traditional hash-based digital signature, 
relies on a checksum outside of the data. Speech watermarking embeds digital watermarks 
into the speech. The speech signature was the first method developed for speech 
authentication in my work and then a watermarking algorithm with use of frequency domain 
linear prediction and a watermarking algorithm based on deterministic and stochastic 
decomposition were exploited. But both of them are not the very convenient solutions for 
market-available speech communication system, thus a speech watermarking algorithm 
incorporating with GSM 610 coder is presented at the last part of this chapter.  
Speech production [4.20] and linear prediction [4.20] is the supporting techniques for 
speech watermarking. So a short introduction about linear prediction is necessary here. It is 
clear that human’s lung pushes the air through the vocal tract and mouth to generate speech. 
The position of vocal tract and oral cavity change the speech. Human’s vocal tract, nasal 
cavity and oral cavity can be modelled as a linear filter, and the lung can be viewed as a 
pump. A speech production model is shown in Fig. 4.1. To construct the linear predictor, a 
series linear parameters need to be extracted. 
 
Figure 4.1:   Linear Predictive Coding 
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Linear prediction is deployed in speech analysis and coding for more than 30 years. It 
assumes the current speech frame can be estimated based on the n-th previous speech frames, 
and the formula is:  
 
s[k] =  ∑ ai *s(k-i) + Gw(k)      (4.1) 
 
{a1, a2, a3, …, aN} are the parameters of the linear filter. The linear filter determines 
the formant of a speech frame thus that the parameters are the salient features of a speech 
frame.  
 
4.1 A Digital Signature Scheme for Speech  
 
Creating a digital signature is the most straightforward way to authenticate the 
integrity and confidentiality of speech. Some modification should be under consideration 
when implementing hashing-based schemes for speech. First, since speech is a series 
consisting of multiple frames, a subtraction of the middle of a speech may damage the 
semantic meaning while a truncation of the unvoiced tail is acceptable. A hashing-based 
authentication method is illustrated in the following.  
There are several spectral parameter sets, i.e., LPC parameters, log area ratios, Mel 
scale cepstrum coefficients, and power density spectrum coefficients, can be used to depict 
the features of a speech. Among them, LPC parameters [4.15] have been used for a long time. 
LPC parameters model the structure of vocal organs, therefore they are be widely used to 
describe the features of a speech.  
Linear predictive coding is commonly used by voice encoders and decoders. Since 
the LPC coefficients are sensitive to distortion, some other advanced representations of linear 
prediction are proposed.  The most commonly used advanced representations include log area 
ratios (LAR), line spectral pairs (LSP), linear spectral frequency (LSF) and reflection 
coefficients (RC). Among the multiple representations, LSP and LSF have been widely used 
due to its stability of the predictor. LSF parameters [4.20] can be computed from LPC 
coefficients directly.  
As we mentioned in the early part of this thesis, message authentication code does not 
have any flexibility to the minor errors, so that a more flexible authentication method for 
multimedia data is needed. 
N 
i=1 
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The proposed speech authentication algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 4.1. A whole 
speech is split to multiple blocks and each block lasts for 20ms. Then the parameters of the 
filter for a block are estimated. A bulk comprising the parameters of 50 filters is applied with 
forward SVD transform.   
 
Figure 4.2:   Watermark Embedding Algorithm 
Mathematically, a matrix, X, can be decomposed as X = U*S*V', which is so-called 
Singular Value Decomposition [4.21]. The matrix S is singular, thus the singular vector of S 
can be used to represent the matrix uniquely. SVD is popularly used since its high resolution 
properties and its insensitivity to model order overestimation.  
At last, an authentication code can be generated based on the singular vector. Then 
the authentication code is sent to the receiver complying with the corresponding speech bulk.  
The SVD process of LSF loose the sensitiveness of the LPC filters thus the proposed scheme 
is more flexible than message authentication code.  
 The receiver does the linear predictive coding on the corresponding speech block and 
then decomposes the LSF parameter matrix using SVD to generate the singular vector, S’. 
Measure the similarity between the received singular vector, S, with the extracted singular 
vector, S’.   Denote S as s[i] and S’ as s’[i], 0≤ i< N. The similarity is calculated as follows: 
  
sim[k] = 1 -          ∑ ( s[i] - s’[i] ) /  s[i]     (4.2) 
 
 A prototype has been implemented using Matlab. Since hashing-based methods are 
not our interest, the further analysis did not perform on this scheme. 
 
4.2 A Speech Watermarking Algorithm by Frequency Domain Linear Prediction 
 
4.2.1 Commonly-Used Skills for Audio Watermarking 
 
A variety of approaches already exist to embed information into audio data. The 
techniques range from the simple LSB method to the spread-spectrum methods. In this 
section, a speech watermarking algorithm using linear prediction coding is presented.  
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Since the human auditory system is higher sensitive than human visual system, the 
watermarking algorithms for audio data have limited categories. The audio watermarking 
algorithms can be classified into two general kinds:  
1) Utilizes the weakness of human auditory system. LSB, echo hiding and phone 
coding LSB (short for Least Significant Bit) coding [4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5] take the advantage of 
precision limitation of human auditory system; LSB has a low robustness while the work load 
of watermarking algorithm is rather low. The phase coding method was presented in [4.1, 4.6, 
4.7]. The basic idea is that human are not sensitive to the change of phone. Echo hiding [4.8, 
4.9] utilizes the temporal post masking of human auditory system.  
2) By digital signal processing skill. I. Cox is the first deployed spread spectrum 
technique in digital watermarking [4.10]. The advantage of spread spectrum watermarking is 
that the distortion is distributed over a great number of parameters while the modification on 
each value is very small. Later, spread spectrum technique was widely used in audio, video, 
image watermarking algorithms [4.10, 4.11].  Sinusoidal modulation [4.22] utilizes the 
orthogonality between sine wave with different frequency. 
 
4.2.2 Linear Prediction in Frequency Domain  
 
Linear prediction usually it works in time domain thus that it was called “time domain 
linear prediction (TDLP)”. In 1996, J. Herre introduced linear prediction method in frequency 
domain (FDLP) [4.16]. In his original work, a signal is firstly converted to DCT coefficients 
and then is applied linear prediction. Later, in 2002, FDLP is included in AVS audio-video 
coding standard [4.18]. M. Athineos and D. Ellis at Columbia University used FDLP to 
extract the sound texture [4.17]. Mathematically, FDLP can be formulated as follows: 
S’ = LP( DCT ( s ) )       (4.3) 
FDLP works as follow: 
1) apply DCT transform on a signal sequence 
2) divide the coefficients into multiple sub-band 
3) do linear predictive coding in each sub-band 
Then one can do analysis on the coefficients matrix of sub-bands or on the spectral 
representation. By FDLP, some new features can be developed to present audio processing 
(the author believes potentially it would be a powerful tool for applied signal processing). In 
 48 
author’s view, DCT can generate the frequency spectrum suitable for a signal, and linear 
predictive method working in frequency domain can describe the frequency pattern 
generation. Thus FDLP presents the rich temporal features of speech in frequency domain.  
 
4.2.3 Speech Watermarking Algorithm Using FDLP 
 
To watermark a speech, an algorithm using linear prediction in frequency domain is 
presented in this subsection. Discrete wavelet transform is exploited in the proposed 
algorithm. Discrete wavelet transform can divide the speech signal into a multiple sub-band 
presentation which is well suited for psychoacoustic model of human auditory system. In 
addition, some wavelet sub-band can still hold some useful important features of speech, such 
as the shapes, even in frequency domain. That makes discrete wavelet transform a better 
choice than the short time Fourier transform in signal processing. 
In our scheme, a whole speech is split to a block sequence by running a hamming 
window through the speech. In wavelet domain, the detail part of a speech block, denoted as 
D[k], describes the high frequency components, while the approximation part, A[k], depicts 
the more smooth part of a speech. Further decompose A[k], the speech can be represented as: 
s[k] = AA[k]     AD[k]    DD[k]     (4.4) 
The approximation part, AD[k], can be viewed as a stationary signal and be 
transformed to a linear predictive presentation. The watermark is embedded in the second-low 
frequency part, AD[k]. Then the watermarked second-low frequency part, AD’ [k], is 
synthesized with the other frequency part to generate the watermarked speech.  
s’[k] = AD’ [k]     AA [k]     DD [k]     (4.5) 
For a stationary signal, s[k], linear prediction synthesis can reconstruct a new one, s’ [k], 
which is quite similar to the original, thus the watermarked speech, s’[k], has a high fidelity.  
The embedding and extraction procedure is performed on each frame and is presented 
as follows: 
 
Embedding Algorithm 
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Figure 4.3:   Watermark Embedding Algorithm 
 As illustrated in Figure 4.3, a speech block, denoted as s[k], passes a DWT filter and 
is divided into a wavelet representation, select AD[k]. Then AD[k] is transformed into a 
sequence of LPC coefficients and the LPC coefficients are mapped to LSF coefficients, a’[k]. 
The LSF parameters are modified to insert the watermark, and are then mapped to LPC 
coefficients. LP synthesizer reconstructs the watermarked component. Reconstruct the 
watermarked speech block s’[k] by inverse DWT.  
Since a slight modification on LPC coefficients can make the LP filter unstable, we 
transform the LPC coefficients to linear spectral frequency (LSF) parameters. LSF parameters 
model an all-pole filter, and have a property of local distortion which makes it more stable 
than LPC coefficients.   
  The watermark embedding is based on additive method. Firstly, a LSF parameters is 
selected and then a small variable, α*w, is added to the selected candidate. In this work, α = 
0.1. The watermark embedding process is described as follows: 
Input: a piece of speech, S 
 a watermark bit sequence, w[0,…,N-1] 
 an index sequence, i[0,…,N-1] 
 (1) split the whole speech into N blocks 
 s[k] ← S*Hamming_Win, where -1 < k < N 
 k ← 0 
(2) transfer one block to wavelet domain 
 if k = N  return  end 
(A[k], D[k]) ← DWT(s[k])  
 (AA[k], AD[k]) ←DWT(A[k])  
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(3) linear prediction 
 a [k] ← LPC(AD[k]), where -1 < k < N 
(4) convert to LSF parameters   
 a’[k] ← LPC2LSF(a [k])  
(5) watermarking 
 if w ≡ 0    a”[i[k]] ← a’[i[k]]  + α*w 
 else          a”[i[k]] ← a’[i[k]] 
(6) convert back to time space 
(7) k ← k+1, goto step (2) 
 
 
Figure 4.4:   A Speech Frame: Original One (upper), Watermarked One (lower) 
Figure 4.4 shows two speech blocks. The watermarking algorithm really modifies some 
niches of the speech. 
 
Extraction Algorithm 
 
Figure 4.5:   Watermark Extraction Algorithm 
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As illustrated in Figure 4.5, a watermarked speech block, denoted as s’[k], passes a 
two-layer DWT filter and is divided into a wavelet representation, AD[k]. Then AD[k] is 
transformed into a sequence of LPC coefficients and the LPC coefficients are mapped to LSF 
parameters, a’[k]. A corresponding original speech block is performed with FDLP, and gets 
a[k]. 
  The watermark extraction is based on subtractive method. The extraction procedure 
is described as follows: 
Input: a piece of watermarked speech, Sw 
 a corresponding original speech, S 
 an index sequence, i[0,…,N-1] 
 (1) split the whole speech into N blocks 
 sw[k] ← Sw*Hamming_Win, where -1 < k < N 
 s[k] ← S*Hamming_Win, where -1 < k < N 
 k ← 0 
(2) transfer one block to wavelet domain 
 if k = N  return  end 
(A[k], D[k]) ← DWT(s[k])  
 (AA[k], AD[k]) ←DWT(A[k])  
(3) linear prediction 
 a [k] ← LPC(AD[k]), where -1 < k < N 
 aw[k] ← LPC(ADw[k]) 
(4) convert to LSF parameters   
 a’[k] ← LPC2LSF(a [k])  
 aw’[k] ← LPC2LSF(aw [k]) 
(5) extraction 
 w← (aw’[i[k]] - a[i[k]]) / α 
(6) k ← k+1, goto step (2) 
 
A watermark bit sequence, w, can be extracted. To estimate the bit error rate, the formula 
below is used. 
BER = 1- count(w, β)/N,     (4.6) 
where β is a threshold, count(*) counts the elements whose values is greater than the 
threshold. In this study, β = 0.8.  
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4.2.4 Experimental Results 
 
In our test, the size of a frame is 256 samples, and for the 8khz test speech, one 
frame lasts for 32ms. Although some details are changed, the overall quality of the 
watermarked speech is still higher than LPC coded one. The robustness of watermarking 
algorithm is satisfied, see Table 4.1.   
 
 
Figure 4.6:   Original Speech (upper) and Watermarked Speech (lower) 
 
 
Table 4.1: Bit Error Rate 
 
 In the low frequency, the frequency pattern is relative stable even having been 
distorted severely. FDLP presentation can describe the pattern of frequency combination, thus 
watermarking the LSF parameters in second-low frequency is robust to attacks. To improve 
 
Original Adding 5% Gaussian 
noise  
Adding 10% Gaussian 
noise 
“att_01.wav” 0.0370 0.0451 0.0503 
“att_02.wav” 0.0216 0.0265 0.0297 
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the quality of watermarked speech, the watermarking procedure should be performed on the 
detail part of the approximation part of level 3 wavelet composition.  
To implement a blind watermarking algorithm, quantization method can be used. In 
addition, in order to improve the robustness of watermark detection, Walsh or Gold codes can 
be used to modulate the watermark. The watermarking algorithm using FDLP is still far from 
the integration with the commercial voice coders, so in the last sub-section, a speech 
watermarking algorithm is proposed which can incorporate with GSM 610 voice coder.  
 
4.3 A Watermarking Algorithm Using Deterministic Plus Stochastic Model 
4.3.1  Deterministic Plus Stochastic Model 
 
 In last sub-section, a watermarking algorithm for speech is presented. Now, we come 
to the watermarking algorithm for music. Nearly all sound can be presented as a deterministic 
part and a stochastic pat. This model, proposed by [4.24], is an improvement to the well 
known sinusoidal model by T. McAulay and J. Quatieri [4.23]. The deterministic plus 
stochastic model is formulated as:  
S = D + E       (4.7) 
Since most of the audio signals are periodic, we can use a summary of sine wave to simulate 
the periodic part of the audio signals.  
d[n] = ∑Ai * cos(wk*n +  )     (4.8) 
 
The different between the original audio with the sine-wave synthesized audio signal is the 
residual part of the signal. Usually we call it the stochastic part. The stochastic part of music 
includes brute of flute and the natural sounds. Figure 4.7 shows a music piece and its 
stochastic part. 
     
N 
i=1 
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Figure 4.7:   The Original Audio (upper) and the Stochastic Part (lower) 
The deterministic part represents the most prominent part of an audio signal while the 
stochastic part is a noise like signal. The energy of the deterministic part is far heavy than the 
stochastic part. This gives us a hint to insert a digital watermark into the stochastic part of the 
audio and still keep the high quality of the audio signal. The stochastic part is also important 
for the high quality commercial music.  
Many people from music community decompose the existing music, and apply some 
modifications, transforms, or enhancements on the specific parameters. Then re-synthesize 
the music. This is a commonly used method in music post processing. Following this method, 
we decompose an audio signal, modify some parameters to engrave the digital watermark, 
and lastly re-synthesize the audio.   
4.3.2  Audio Watermarking on Stochastic Part 
 
Watermark Embedding Algorithm 
 
To watermark the stochastic part of an audio signal, the original audio signal should 
be separated to a deterministic part and a stochastic part. Then insert the watermark into the 
not important part of the stochastic part.  
The embedding process can be illustrated as follows: 
1) separate the audio signal to a deterministic part and a stochastic part 
2) convert a block into wavelet domain 
3) insert the watermark into the low frequency part of the wavelet coefficients 
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4) convert the watermarked wavelet coefficients back to time domain 
5) add the watermarked stochastic part with the deterministic part to form the 
watermarked audio signal 
 
The embedding process can be illustrated as Figure 4.8.  
  
 
Figure 4.8:   The Watermark Embedding Algorithm 
 The first step, deterministic and stochastic decomposition, applies the short time 
Fourier transforms on the audio signal. Then search the frequency tracks in the spectral 
representations to detect the amplitudes, phases and frequencies of the sine waves. The details 
of this decomposition can be seen in [4.24]. Then feed the parameters (amplitudes, phases and 
frequencies) to a sine oscillator to synthesize the deterministic part, d[n]. Lastly, subtract the 
original audio signal with the synthesized audio signal to retrieve the stochastic part, e[n]. Part 
of the Matlab codes for this step is adapted from the source code from Speech and Audio 
Processing Group of Columbia University.  
 The stochastic part can be extracted either in frequency domain or in time domain. In 
this work, the stochastic part is extracted in time domain. Figure 4.9 shows the spectral 
distribution of the original audio signal with its stochastic part. The prominent part has been 
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eliminated from the stochastic part. Although the stochastic part is noise like, it really plays 
an important role for the high quality audio products.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.9:   The Original Audio (upper) and the Stochastic Part (lower) 
 As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the wavelet transforms can separate the signal into 
multiple sub-bands. The distortion introduced in the middle frequency coefficients does not 
degrade the quality of audio signal and not easily be eliminated. To embed the digital 
watermark, w, into the stochastic part, e[n], the wavelet transform is employed first and then 
modify the middle frequency coefficients. Lastly, converts the watermarked coefficients back 
into the time domain. We get the watermarked stochastic part till now. The details are 
depicted as follows: 
Input: the stochastic part of the audio signal, E 
 a watermark bit sequence, w[0,…,N-1] 
(1) split E into N blocks 
 e[k] ← S*Hamming_Win, where -1 < k < N 
 k ← 0 
(2) transform one block to wavelet domain 
 if k = N  return  end 
(A[k], D[k]) ← DWT(e[k])  
 (DA[k], DD[k]) ←DWT(D[k])  
(3) watermarking 
 if w[k] ≡ 0    DD[k] ← 0 
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 else          DD[k] ← DD[k] 
(4) convert back to time space 
(5) k ← k+1, goto step (2) 
 
 Figure 4.10 show the original stochastic part and the watermarked one. They are quite 
similar. Since the stochastic part is noise like, so the modification on the low frequency does 
not degrade the stochastic part severely. 
 
 
Figure 4.10:   The Original Stochastic Part (upper) and the Watermarked Stochastic Part 
(lower) 
 Now, add the watermarked stochastic part, EW, with the synthesized deterministic 
part, D, to form the watermarked audio signal, SW. Figure 4.11 shows the original audio 
signal and the watermarked audio signal. The watermarked audio signal is quite similar to the 
original audio signal.  
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Figure 4.11:   The Original Audio (upper) and the Watermarked Audio (lower) 
Watermark Extraction Algorithm 
 
Figure 4.12:   The Watermark Embedding Algorithm 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.12, a watermarked audio signal, denoted as SW, passes a 
sinusoidal parameters estimator to detect the amplitudes, the phases, and the frequencies. 
Then synthesize the deterministic part, D’. Subtract the deterministic part from the original 
watermarked audio signal to get the watermarked stochastic part, E’.  
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The watermarked stochastic part, E’, is fed to a two-layer DWT filter and is divided 
into a wavelet representation. Extract the embedded digital watermark, W’, from the low 
frequency coefficients. The extraction procedure is described as follows: 
Input: the watermarked stochastic part, E’ 
Output: the extracted watermark, w[0..N-1] 
(1) Split E into N blocks 
 e[k] ← E’*Hamming_Win, where -1 < k < N 
 k ← 0 
(2) Transfer one block to wavelet domain 
 if k = N  return  end 
(A[k], D[k]) ← DWT(e[k])  
 (DA[k], DD[k]) ←DWT(D[k])  
(3) Extract the embedded watermark 
 if mean(DD[k]) < α  w[k] ← 0  
 else   w[k] ← 1 
   in this study, α = 0.01 
(4) k ← k+1, goto step (2) 
A watermark bit sequence, w, can be extracted. To estimate the error rate, the formula below 
is used. 
ER = count(w)/N,     (4.9) 
 
4.3.3  Experimental Results 
 
Figure 4.13 shows a wavelet coefficients vector of details. All elements of this vector 
should be zero. Due to the interference of the other sub-bands, the vector is modified. But the 
values of the elements are still very small, and this can help us to determine the watermark. 
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Figure 4.13:   The Extracted Watermarked cDD 
 
Table 4.2: Error Rate 
 
 From Table 4.2, we can find the proposed algorithm is sensitive to the noise. Since 
the stochastic part of an audio signal is noise like, and the watermark is embedded in the 
stochastic part. Thus introducing the noise can degrade the performance of the algorithm 
dramatically. 
 
4.4 A Speech Watermarking Algorithm Incorporating with GSM 610 Speech Coder 
 
Linear prediction is a method for the discrete time signals, and it predicts the future 
values based on a linear functions of former samples sample of the signal. A filter transfer 
 
Original Adding 2% Gaussian 
noise  
Adding 5% Gaussian 
noise 
“clar.wav” 0.0084 0.0374 0.0967 
“att_01.wav” 0.0191 0.0627 0.1139 
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function is exploited to simulate the vocal tract transfer function. By ingenious design, the 
linear predictive coding can yield high quality of speech.  
4.4.1 GSM 610 Speech Coder 
Speech coders can be classified into three types: Waveform coder, source coder and 
hybrid coder. The waveform coders attempt to maintain the original waveform and the coding 
is based on quantisation and redundancy within the waveform. In contrast, source coders 
make no attempt to reproduce the original waveform, but instead derive a set of parameters at 
the encoder, which are transmitted and used to control a speech production model at the 
receiver. Hybrid coders combine features from both waveform coders and source coder to 
provide good quality, efficient speech coding. At rates between about 16 kbit/s and 4 kbit/s, 
good quality coding is achieved using ‘analysis by synthesis’ techniques, as shown in Figure 
4.14. The objective is to derive an excitation signal, like that produced by the glottis, such that 
the difference between the input and synthesised speech signals is minimized according to 
some suitable perceptual criterion. GSM 610 (RPE-LTP) coder [4.14] is a kind of widely used 
hybrid speech coders . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.14:   Analysis-by-synthesis Coding Scheme 
 
Regular Pulse Excitation, Long-Term Prediction (RPE-LTP) linear predictive coders 
[4.14] are widely used in current wireless telecommunication. We can find them in cell 
phones and PDAs. It first removes local correlation between samples and produces either a 
pitch residual, or a noise-like signal for unvoiced speech, and then quantifies the harmonics of 
the speech. Later, the RPE stage reduces the residual samples down to four sets of 13-bit sub-
sequences. The optimum sub-sequence is determined as having the least error. The resulting 
signal is fed back in order to help the processing of the next frame. The resulting signal is 
shown in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3: Output of RPE-LTP Vocoder 
Parameter Number of values Bits per frame 
LARs 8 per frame 36 bits 
LTP lag 1 per subframe (7 bits ) 28 bits 
LTP gain 1 per subframe (2 bits ) 8 bits 
RPE grid position 1 per subframe (2 bits ) 8 bits 
Block amplitude 1 per subframe (6 bits ) 24 bits 
RPE Pulses 13 per subframe (3 bits each ) 156 bits 
Total  260 bits  
 
 
4.4.2 Speech Feature Extraction for Efficient Authentication 
 
Feature extraction method is widely deployed for speech integrity authentication 
algorithms. Some audio watermarking algorithms use different statistical properties, such as 
pitch values, salient points and so on, of the host audio and modify them in order to embed 
watermark. Paper such as [4.12] introduced content-adaptive segmentation of the host audio 
according to its characteristics in time domain. The algorithm presented in [4.13] extends the 
mute period of the host audio to embed the watermarks. The technique of self-embedding, 
illustrated in Figure 4.15, is a kind of feature extraction skill, which tries to embed extracted 
feature values back into the audiovisual data. Wu’s work [5.5] shows that self-embedding has 
two drawbacks: (a) a very high data capacity for watermarking; (b) most self-embedding 
methods operate at high computational costs. Thus the known self-embedding algorithms are 
not applicable for low data rate speech encoders such as GSM 610 voice encoder. Therefore, 
we developed a new feature-embedding algorithm for such encoders. 
Two design requirements for speech feature selections include:  
1) In order to resist to the lossy speech coding, the selected features should not be 
altered greatly by speech coding;  
2) The computation cost of feature extraction should be small. 
 
Since no computationally demanding transform of the host signal needs to be done, 
an algorithm operates in time domain has a very small algorithmic delay. This permits the use 
on this kind of algorithms in real-time applications.  
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Figure 4.15:   Self-embedding Scheme 
 
 
4.4.3 Watermark Embedding and Extraction 
In real-time speech processing the computation and delays of the watermarking 
algorithm should be small enough. In speech coding, for example, due to the transmission of 
speech, other resources of the system also become more limited. In addition to the 
computational complexity and delays, the bandwidth sets its limitations to the amount of data 
transmitted, i.e. to the number of parameters used and to the accuracy of quantization applied. 
This requirement makes the voice encoders eliminate the redundancy of the speech and 
minimize the volume of the quantization coefficients.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.16: Proposed Speech Watermarking Scheme 
 
In the proposed scheme, RPE pulses are modified slightly to engrave the digital 
watermarks. In this work, two digital watermarks, namely speech_watermark and 
comm_watermark, are used for each transaction. For the purpose of source origin 
authentication and integrity, a speech message will be inserted into a unique fragile 
watermark, speech_watermark. In contrast, a comm_watermark will be inserted into the 
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speech message to ensure the authenticity and integrity of real-time speech transmission. Both 
digital watermarks and private keys are binary sequences. 
A GSM 610 coder generates 52 RPE pulses of 3 bits each for a speech frame of 20 ms 
duration. An RPE pulse pair in one frame is chosen to embed one bit of the digital watermark. 
The pulse couple is selected according to key, as depicted in Figure 4.16. Consider x’ and x 
are the least significant bits of the selected candidate RPE pulses. Then the watermark 
embedding and extraction algorithm works as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.17: Audio Watermarking Algorithm 
(1) speech_watermark 
key is an integer pair {(p1, p2) | 0≤ p1, p2<50}. To embed one bit of the secret watermark, 
speech_watermark, select two RPE pulses from the first 50 RPE pulses according to key. The 
least significant bit of two selected RPE pulses are the candidate bit pair (x, x’). Apply the 
algorithm mentioned above to engrave a bit of speech_watermark.    
(2) comm_watermark 
comm_watermark is public, the last two RPE pulses of one frame are selected to hide one bit 
of comm_watermark. The least significant bit of each selected RPE pulses are the candidate 
bit pair (x, x’). Apply the algorithm mentioned above. Figure 4.4 shows an example of the 
proposed audio watermarking algorithm.  
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The proposed algorithm uses feature extraction technique to enhance the 
authentication capacity. Each one identifies oneself by his unique speech. Log Area Ratios 
(LARs) are the reflection coefficients modeling the shape of vocal tract, thus that it is very 
common-used in speaker recognition techniques. So we choose LARs as the principal speech 
features.  
GSM 610 vocoder generates 36 bits LAR parameters for every 20ms, and its feature 
value can be coarsely calculated as: 
 
F( LARs ) = MOD(                     / 2   ) 
 
Then apply ( w, F(·) ) to generate a new watermark bit w’. Hence the feature of 
vocal tract is integrated into the proposed speech watermarking algorithm.  
 
Table 4.4:    ( w, F(·) ) 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.4  Experimental Results 
The overhead brought on the GSM vocoder by the watermarking module is shown in 
the following table, whereas a Pentium 3 – 800MHz CPU with 356MB RAM was used. 
Table 4.5: Watermarking Overhead on GSM 610 Coder 
 
 
 
 
 The distortion introduced by the watermarking is rather low, see Figure 4.18. It is 
very clear that this speech watermarking algorithm has a quite limited usage. But the similar 
approach can be used in watermarking algorithms for the other vocoders deploying linear 
predictive coding, such as CELP vocoder. 
 
Encoding/decoding 
Time of a Frame 
Computing Time for 
Watermarking in a Frame 
Watermarking 
Time/Encoding Time 
287.63 µs 2.79 µs 1 % 
F( LARs ) 
W 
0 1 
1 0 0 
1 1 0 
(4.6) 
36 
i=1 
∑  LARi
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Figure 4.18: Watermarked (a) and Original Speech (b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) 
(b) 
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Chapter 5  Watermarking Mechanism For Real-Time Speech Transmission 
 
 
Internet telephony unveils some special properties stemming from both multimedia 
data and real-time communication. First, end users cannot perceive limited distortions in 
multimedia data, so, some bit errors and packets losses occurring during communication do 
not defect the overall visual/audio quality. Secondly, due to controlling protocols and 
implementations of real-time multimedia communication, packet losses may happen any time. 
Thirdly, caused by the large amount of multimedia data, the communication security trade-
offs should be as low as possible. In this chapter, we present a security scheme using speech 
watermarking technique. 
 
5.1   Real-time Speech Communication Systems 
VoIP or Internet telephony is a technology allows people to perform telephone 
service using the existing IP-based data network, thus it can avoid the tolls charged by 
telephone service provider. VoIP booms in the past five years. Skype and Vbuzzer are the 
best runners in the competition. However, lot of security incidents occurred in the last years 
and their number is still increasing. Therefore, security is an essential topic for VoIP 
telephony systems [5.2]. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: A Typical VoIP Implementation 
Source: http://www.ebstrategy.co.uk/whitepapers/voip/voipsolutions.pdf 
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5.1.1 Architecture 
  
A typical VoIP network is illustrated in Figure 5.1. A VoIP network has the major 
components similar in functionality to a traditional circuit-switched network. There are three 
major components of a VoIP network, and they are voice gateways, signaling controllers and 
IP network. The most important techniques to VoIP includes high quality low-rate voice 
coders, routing techniques and transmission protocols.  
 
5.1.2 Major Transmission Protocol and RTP 
There are four main stream transmission protocols being used nowadays. The four 
transmission protocols are originated from the different sources or different communities. 
H.323, SIP (short for Session Initiation Protocol) [5.14], MGCP (short for Media Gateway 
Control Protocol) [5.15] and Megaco (short for Media Gateway Control Protocol) [5.12] are 
the VoIP protocols suites standardized by the different organization or vendors. Among them, 
H.323 and SIP are the most widely used. H.323, developed by ITU in 1996, enables voice 
communication, video communication and files transmission. SIP, defined by IETF, is a 
signaling protocol and works on application level. SIP can establish a VoIP connection and 
supports IP telephony, conferencing and instant messaging. 
In a packet-switched network, TCP is used for signaling, parameter negotiations, path 
setup, and control. UDP is used for transmission of payload (traffic) from sources generating 
real-time packet traffic.  
A note worth to be mentioned is that SIP can perform the data transmission on HTTP 
protocol. This is a big attempt to increase the flexibility of VoIP systems to transmit data over 
heterogeneous networks. SIP can deploy a lot of low cost devices, such as cell phones, 
network computers, and set-on-top boxes. In addition, it is easy to extend the SIP protocol 
family to perform the new service. 
The Real-time Transport Protocol is defined as a transmission protocol, which 
provides end-to-end delivery services for data with real-time characteristics, such as 
interactive audio and video. Both H.323 and SIP utilize RTP protocols as the carrier 
protocols.  
 
 69 
5.1.3 Security Issues of VoIP 
 
Figure 5.4: Security Threat to VoIP Systems  
              Source: “Enterprise IP Telephony Securing Voice Today”, Cisco, 10/6/2003 
 
There are five different categories of security services present for IP telephony: 
Identification and authentication, Authorization, Confidentiality, Integrity, Non-denial/Non-
repudiation. These security aspects can be addressed by means of different cryptographic 
techniques such as secret key cryptography, public key cryptography, and hash functions, 
respectively. In this work, we focus on integrity and source origin authentication of 
multimedia data. By multimedia data integrity and authenticity mechanisms, we can provide 
some very useful related information, such as the speaker’s identity, the point in time when 
dialog happened, and the integrity/authenticity of the transaction.  
There are two types of authentication: Proof that the packets have not been tampered 
with, known as integrity protection, and proof that the packets came from the correct source, 
known as source origin authentication. 
Integrity protection is achieved through the use of message authentication codes. 
These codes take a packet to be protected, a key known only to the sender and receivers and 
use these to generate a unique signature. Provided that the key is not known to an attacker, it 
is impossible to change the contents of the packet without causing a mismatch between the 
packet contents and the message authentication code.  
Source origin authentication is much harder for RTP applications. It might be simply 
addressed by means of message authentication codes, but it is more difficult because a shared 
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secret between sender and receiver is not sufficient. On the other hand, the digital signature is 
larger and needs a high computing resource for public key cryptography. In addition, the 
source origin authentication is only applicable over a single RTP data packet. There is no 
existing solution to ensure the content security of the whole session. 
Like confidentiality, authentication can be applied at either the application layer or 
the IP layer, with much the same set of advantages and disadvantages. Both alternatives have 
been developed for use with RTP. 
Standard RTP [2.11] provides no support for integrity protection or source origin 
authentication. Implementations that require authentication should either implement secure 
RTP or use a lower-layer authentication service such as that provided by the IP security 
extensions. 
 
i) Authentication Using the Secure RTP Profile 
SRTP [2.1] supports both message integrity protection and source origin authentication. For 
integrity protection, a message authentication tag is appended to the end of the packet, as it 
was discussed in Section 2.1.2.2. The message authentication tag is calculated over the entire 
RTP packet and is computed after the packet has been encrypted.  
 
ii) Authentication Using IPSec 
Authentication in IPSec is provided by the Encapsulating Security Payload profile, or 
Authentication Header (AH) [2.2].   
 
iii) Confidentiality Using IP Security 
IPsec [2.2] provides confidentiality by encrypting the payload of RTP data packets 
but it is not RTP-specific. 
 
iv) Fast Encryption Methods for Audiovisual Data Confidentiality 
Selective algorithm [2.3], ZIG-ZAG permutation [2.4] and Video Encryption 
Algorithm [2.5] incorporate cryptographic techniques with multimedia compression 
algorithm. 
 
v) Digital Watermarking 
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Usually, the sender applies MAC or digital watermarking on the multimedia data to 
achieve the integrity and authenticity. As well, the receiver applies MAC or watermarking 
algorithms for the future integrity and authenticity check or multimedia indexing [5.11].  
 
The existing security approaches work in different levels/components in secure 
multimedia communication systems. Fast encryption methods for multimedia data (i.e., 
Selective algorithm [2.3], ZIG-ZAG permutation [2.4] and Video Encryption Algorithm [2.5]) 
incorporate cryptographic techniques with multimedia compression algorithm. SRTP, which 
provide encryption and integrity functionalities, works in application level in TCP/IP stack. 
TLS/SSL and IPSec can set up secure channels between the sender and the receiver and they 
work in the transport layer and network layer respectively. 
 
5.2  Watermarking-Based Security System for Real-time Speech Communications 
A large variety of audio watermarking algorithms has been proposed in the past and a 
few of them can be adapted for speech watermarking applications such as [5.5, 5.6, 5.7]. 
Many of these algorithms operate in time domain and exploit temporal or spectral masking 
models of the human auditory system. The most challenging requirement in real-time 
application, however, is to detect the fragile watermark in, say, every 0.5 seconds of speech 
with a reasonable error probability, especially when modern speech coders compress 0.5 sec 
of speech to less than 400 bytes of data.  
The digital watermarks embedded in the original data may contain some useful 
information, e.g., author names, date of generation, or copyright holders. With the use of the 
blind digital watermarking algorithm, the embedded digital watermark can be extracted 
accurately without the need of the original multimedia data. Potential attackers, on the other 
hand, cannot retrieve the embedded watermarks without the knowledge of the private key or 
of the original data, respectively. Fragile audio watermarking algorithms can thus detect 
severe tampers/attacks occurred on the multimedia data. Therefore, it is a pretty useful 
method to ensure both authenticity and integrity of multimedia data.  
Fragile digital watermarking provides an alternative approach to increase the safety of 
multimedia data during transmission in openly accessible channels. That is, digital 
watermarks may be generated referring to information on, say, originators, receivers, unique 
serial number, and time stamps. These watermarks are then embedded into the multimedia 
data to assure its integrity and source origin authentication without degrading the overall 
quality of the transmitted multimedia data.  
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A point should be mentioned is that integrating speech watermarking technique with 
VoIP can solve the authentication requirement and integrity requirement of an Internet 
telephony system. The confidentiality or secrecy should be achieved by encryption. An 
alternative for the encryption scheme is to exploit the audio or video perturbation. Multimedia 
data perturbation is a slight work load secrecy method with promising future. 
5.2.1 Outline  
SRTP protects the integrity of each data packet instead of the whole conversation data 
which consisting of hundreds or thousands of audio data packets. In Internet telephony, an 
audio data packet contains the compressed sample for short 20 ms, thus a packet loss does not 
degrade the quality of service. Figure 5.5 is an integrity model applicable for the whole 
conversation data. Each speech data packet, pk, has its own local integrity value, Ik, and the 
overall integrity is denoted as I. The overall integrity function is defined as 
 
 
 
 
here N is the total number of the packets, and { Ik | 0 ≤ Ik ≤ 1, 0 ≤ k ≤ N} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5:   A New Integrity Model 
Usually, the Internet telephone sends an RTP packet at an interval (denoted as t) of 
20ms or 40ms, and 0.5s of speech (denoted as s) represents one accurate semantic meaning, 
so that the distortion of a RTP packet in a short period does not change the semantic meaning 
of the whole session. In other words, if a burst of distortion lasts for less than 0.25 s or for s/2t 
RTP packets being transmitted, then the quality of the session does degrade, but the integrity 
or authenticity of the multimedia communication is not destroyed. So, the proposed integrity 
and authenticity measurement can be taken on a range consisting of m (m << s/2t) RTP 
packets to tolerate the possible network distortion.  
Integrity 
  N 
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In our work, a local integrity value, Ik, is calculated at intervals of 12 RTP packets. 
With the help of sequence number of the received packets, the synchronization of assessment 
can be easily achieved. Due to the packet loss, in some cases only p (p < 12) RTP packets are 
received in an interval. If the number of lost RTP packets is small, say, less than 2, we can 
ignore the small distortion and we set the local integrity value to 1. 
Digital watermarking provides an alternative approach to ensure the safety of 
multimedia data during transmission in openly accessible channels. The digital watermarks 
may be embedded into the multimedia data to assure its integrity and authenticity without 
degrading the overall quality of the transmitted data.  
We apply the scheme described in Section 2.2.1. In the real work, both the sender and 
receiver share one reference watermark (comm_watermark) from an independent trustworthy 
party before the multimedia data transmission really starts. To provide the non-repudiate and 
authenticity, a secret digital watermark, speech_watermark, is being introduced. 
speech_watermark has previously been encrypted with a public key algorithm, e.g., RSA.  
The sender embeds both a public, comm_watermark, and a secret watermark, 
speech_watermark, into the outgoing multimedia data stream. The receiver then extracts the 
public digital watermark from its incoming stream. This scheme provides an integrated 
solution to secure multimedia communication and multimedia data integrity.  
The network transportation path can be viewed as a noisy channel. The reference 
digital watermark is modulated with multimedia data (carrier) and transmitted onto the noisy 
channel. The watermark undergoes the same changes suffered by the multimedia data, so that 
the watermark degradation can be used to estimate the overall alterations of the multimedia 
data caused by noise or by attacks.  At the receiver side the embedded digital watermark is 
extracted and compared to the original reference watermark in order to measure the integrity 
and authenticity of the received multimedia data.  
 
5.2.2 Suppression of the Packet Loss 
Packet losses always happen during the network transmission. This makes it very 
difficult to devise objective quality measurements for different repair schemes. It is not 
sufficient to measure the difference between the original waveform from the source and the 
waveform recovered at the receiver, because the perceived quality has no direct relation to the 
differences in the waveforms.  
The packet loss can be determined by checking the sequence number of a RTP data 
transfer packet. The receiver has a ring to record the sequence numbers. The receiver extracts 
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the sequence number of each incoming RTP data packet and then writes it to the ring. If the 
newest entity of the ring is not adjacent to its nearest entity, which shows RTP data packet has 
happened.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Packet Loss Suppression 
 
Since packet loss always happens during the transmission, synchronization between 
sent and received speech signals are very important to this approach. If some RTP data 
packets were lost, the watermark detector should skip the number of lost data packets to 
synchronize the watermarking authentication procedure.   
 
5.2.3 Operation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7:    Secure Multimedia Communication 
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At the beginning of each real-time multimedia communication, user2 sends a 
dialog_start requests to transServer and notifies the callee, user1. Then, user1 also sends a 
dialog_start requests to transServer. The dialog_start requests contain the digital certificates 
of the communicating parties. transServer authenticates the participants by verifying their 
digital certificates extracted from the received dialog_start requests.  
If acceptable, transServer generates a pair of transCerts, sends the transCerts to the 
participants, and stores them in its database, as depicted in Figure 5.7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Real-Time Authentication for VoIP 
 
Once the participants receive the transCerts from transServer, the conversation may 
begin. At first, they authenticate the received transaction certificate. If the authentication is 
successful, then the participants parse the received transCerts to ((speech_watermark, key) 
comm_watermark) and insert then the digital watermarks into their outgoing audio data 
streams. At the same time, both participants extract the comm_watermark from their incoming 
streams and authenticate them, as depicted in Figure 5.8. At the end of the transmission, i.e., 
conversation, each of the participants sends a dialog_end request to transServer. transServer 
authenticates the received dialog_end request and puts them on file. 
The simplest way to tolerate packet loss during the real-time transmission is present 
in 5.2.2. But in order to enhance the tolerance to packet loss and bit errors that may occur in 
the saved multimedia data, a more flexible solution is given. The sender deploys the derived 
Walsh codes to modulate the digital watermarks. Some synchronization marks, denoted as 
SYNC, are inserted into the modulated Walsh codes sequence. That is 1111 stands for SYNC, 
1001 stands for ‘0’, and 1010 stands for ‘1’. The resulting sequence is represented as {b0, b1, 
b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, SYNC, ….., SYNC, bj-1, bj, bj+1,….bn}. The bits in between an adjacent 
SYNC pair consist of a phase.  The sender embeds this bit sequence into the outgoing 
multimedia stream. 
IP Phone A 
Embedding speech 
speech_watermark comm_watermark 
IP Phone B 
Extraction speech 
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On the other side, the receiver retrieves a bit sequence, {b0’, b1’, b2’, b3’, SYNC, ….., 
SYNC, bj-1’, bj+1’,….bn’}, from the incoming  stream. Since both the sender and the receiver 
share comm_watermark, the reference bit sequence, {b0, b1, b2, b3, SYNC, ….., SYNC, bj-1, bj, 
bj+1,….bn}, is accessible by the receiver. 
During the communication procedure the receiver performs the following steps to 
evaluate the integrity and authenticity of the data being transmitted in the channel: 
 
Initialization: prepare a buffer to hold the retrieved bits  
Step: 
1) scan buffer; if SYNC found, then goto step 1 
2) extract one embedded digital watermark bit from one multimedia frame       
and put it into buffer; repeat step 1 
3) evaluate the partial integrity and authenticity; clear the buffer  
4) if not end of communication, then goto step1. 
 
 Due to the possible packet loss and bit errors, the integrity and authenticity 
assessment looks a little complicated. 
 (1) If the size of the extracted bit sequence (N) is equal to the size of the reference bit 
sequence (no packet loss has happened), then compare the extracted bit sequence with the 
reference bit sequence as follow:   
 
 
 
 
(2) Maybe the size of the extracted bit sequence, M, is not equal to the size of the 
reference bit sequence, N, either due to packet loss or due to a loss of SYNC. If the size of the 
extracted bit sequence is smaller, then the integrity and authenticity estimation work as 
follows: 
Denote the reference bit sequence as Br and the extracted bit sequence as 
Bx 
Step: 
1) find the most left and the most right common strings (sizes are de-
noted as ll and lr) from Br and Bx 
2) remove the most left and the most right common strings from the two 
bit sequences 
  N 
I = (5.2) 
N
i=1 
∑(bi XNOR bi’) 
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3) find the longest common string from the two bit sequences; the length 
of the common string is lc  
 
The integrity value of this phase is given by 
 
 
 
(3) If the size of the extracted bit sequence is larger (the synchronization code has been 
destroyed), then combine the adjacent two reference phases and perform the above procedure 
to estimate the multimedia integrity and authenticity.  
 Many existing real-time multimedia communication protocols deploy symmetric 
ciphers to set up a secure channel. In these cases the proposed real-time integrity and 
authenticity assessment can be exploited as a method to measure the quality of the 
transmission.   
 
5.2.4 Source Origin Authentication 
The secret digital watermarks, speech_watermarks, embedded in the multimedia 
messages have been signed by transServer using public-key encryption.  This means that each 
of the watermarked conversation data is distinguishable from others.  Therefore, one can 
verify the source origin of the saved multimedia data: 1) A (speech_watermark, key) pair can 
be parsed from the proper transCert; 2) extract a digital watermark, w’, from the recorded 
conversation data and compare it with the original one to authenticate the inspected speech. 
The authentication procedure can be illustrated by pseudo codes as follow:  
 
(speech_watermark, key) ← Parse( transCert ) 
Answer ← Authen( speech_watermark, PK ) 
if ( Answer ≡ TRUE ) { 
w’ ← Extract( Recorded Dialog, key ) 
Answer ← Compare(w’, w ) 
 } 
 
  N 
I = 
ll + lr + lc (5.3) 
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5.3 An Implementation on Internet Telephony 
5.3.1 Components of Test Environment 
To prove the evidence of the proposed scheme, a prototype has been developed and 
implemented by means of a desktop computer and a notebook. The prototype architecture 
consists of a pair of IP phones and a transServer.  
 
IP Phones 
IP phones are adapted from Speakfreely [5.8], a well-known open source IP 
telephony implementation. Both the implemented transServer and IP phones employ the 
OpenSSL toolkit to handle digital certificates and to generate transCerts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Software Components of an Internet Telephone 
 
Each IP phone has been assigned a X.509 digital certificate to uniquely identify itself. 
All of the IP phones’ digital certificates are registered by transServer. 
Watermarking Control Protocol (WMCP) is an author-designed software component, 
which is in charge of digital watermark embedding/detection, set-up process control. Also the 
last procedure of speech coding of GSM 610 vocoder has been modified.  
In the beginning of the conversation, the WMCP uses the phone’s certificate to 
generate a Dialog_start_request, and sends the request to the transServer via the OpenSSL 
enabled secure channel. Once receives the answer from the transServer, the WMCP validates 
the received transCert first, and parse the certificate to generate a private watermark, 
speech_watermark, and a public watermark, comm._watermark. Then WMCP activates the 
audio capture unit of the IP phone, and sends the watermark pair to the GSM encoder/decoder. 
The watermark embedder inserts the watermark pair into the frames, and the detector extracts 
the embedded public watermark bits from the incoming audio frame. The operations of 
WMCP can be illustrated as follow: 
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Phone  Setup a secure channel with transServer 
Rq ← ( Phone’s Certificate, TID, RQ_FLAG ) k // Generate Dialog Request 
   Dialog_Start_Rq → transServer   // Send request to transServer 
      // Waiting 
 
   Authen( ( DigCert, TS )k )k 
   Open two secure channels with the other phone   
//(a signaling channel and a data channel) 
w ← Parse( transCert ) 
{  
 on data channel  
   forever 
{ 
{ 
Embed( voice frame, w’) → watermarked frame 
     watermarked frame → another phone 
    } 
    { 
receive( watermarked frame )  
     extraction( watermarked frame ) → w 
    } 
   } 
 on signal channel  
   waiting 
   if ( controlling signal ≡ TERMINATE ) 
   { 
    break the data channel 
    Dialog_end_rq → transServer 
   } 
}  
    
transServer 
 transServer is a server facilitated with OpenSSL toolkits. It authenticates the IP 
phones’ identifications during the setup of a conversation, generates a pair of transCerts, and 
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issues them to the appropriate IP phones. At the end of the conversation, it receives the 
request from the IP phones, and then finishes the conversation. transServer uses service_no to 
identify the multiple conversations happening in parallel. 
 
Figure 5.10: Software Architecture of transServer 
  
Fig. 5.10 illustrates the layered architecture of transServer. The controlling unit is 
monitoring the running processes of the whole server. It communicates with the 
communication unit, transCert generator and IP phone authenticator. The communication 
unit is listening to the connection port all time. And it transmits the request to the controlling 
unit. Once the controlling unit receive a request, it analyses the request and decides which 
software modules should be called. Specifically, if the controlling unit receives a 
Dialog_start_request, it retrieves the certificate of the caller, and sends the certificate to the 
IP phone authenticator. If the return from the phone authenticator is true, the controlling unit 
generates a service_no, and sends the service_no, the caller’s ID and callee’s ID to the 
transCert generator. The transCert generator generates a transCert, and signs the private 
watermark, speech_watermark, with the private key of the transServer. Once the controlling 
unit received the returned transCert from the transCert generator, it put the transCert on the 
transaction list and sends the transCert to the participators of the conversation.  
 If the controlling unit receives a Dialog_end_request, it inserts a timestamp to the 
transaction list to indicate the time of finish and then moves the record, which containing the 
information of this transaction, from the transaction list, into data management unit. At last it 
Controling Unit 
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sends the answer to the participators to finish the conversation. The OpenSSL utilities are 
utilized for several times during one transaction.  
 The operations of the transServer can be illustrated as follows: 
 
 transServer 
      // Waiting 
 
Analyse the received request 
  If (Dialog_Start_rq ≡ TRUE ) 
  {  
Authen( Phone’s Certificate) →isValidPhone // Authenticate Phone 
if ( isValidPhone ≡ TRUE ) 
{  
watermark, key ← RANDOM()   // Generate a transCert  
tag ← ( SessionID, RAND )   
transCert ← Sign( tag, PK )  
} 
(time mark, caller’s ID, callee’s ID) →Database 
   transCert→Phones    // Send a transCert to the phone 
  } 
If (Dialog_End_rq ≡ TRUE )    // at the end of a conversation 
  {  
Authen( Phone’s Certificate) →isValidPhone  // Authenticate Phone 
if ( isValidPhone ≡ TRUE ) 
{  
(duration, isSuceed) ← Dialog_End_rq()   // Generate a transCert
 (duration, time mark, isSuceed, service num) →Database   
} 
 } 
       
 // Waiting  
 
 
transCert 
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 A pair of transCerts is issued by transServer to identify this conversation. A 
transCert contains a private watermark, its key, a public watermark and a service registration 
number. 
 
struct trans_cert 
{ 
 
 unsigned char speech_watermark[32]; // private watermark 
 unsigned char key[256];  // key for private watermark 
 unsigned char comm_watermark[16]; // public watermark 
 long  service_no;  // conversation registration number at transServer 
}; 
 
 
5.3.2 Experimental Results In Local Area Network 
Some test runs for the proposed speech watermarking algorithm were performed. The 
first experiment was performed on a 100M Ethernet LAN being used as the communication 
network. In addition, we tested the network scenario comprising both an 100Mb/s Ethernet 
LAN and a 11Mb/s WLAN. The upper row of Table 5.1 shows the result of a test, which was 
run by a VoIP end-point couple on 100Mb/s Ethernet. The lower row shows the test result 
taken from the wireless LAN scenario as described in Section 1. The average packet loss 
(including packet delay) is quite low for VoIP devices working on wired LAN and the 
performance decreases in a wireless environment. But the proposed integrity measurement is 
robust enough to suppress the degradation of the network.  
 
 
Table 5.1:  Integrity Values in WLAN 
 
To prove the evidence of the proposed scheme, a prototype has been developed and 
implemented by means of desktop computers. The prototype architecture consists of a pair of 
IP phones and a transServer. IP phones are adapted from Speakfreely, a well-known open 
 
No. Total 
Packet  
No. Packet Loss, 
Delay & Errors  
No.  
Water-mark Errors 
Integrity 
Value 
Test on 100Mb/s 
Ethernet LAN 
16390 6 6 99.96% 
Test on 11Mb/s 
WLAN 
16908 285 112 99.83% 
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source IP telephony implementation. Both the implemented transServer and IP phones 
employ the OpenSSL toolkit [5.9] to handle digital certificates and to generate transCerts. A 
desktop and a notebook are used in our experiment as the IP phone devices. The desktop has a 
Pentium 3 800MHz CPU and 356 MB RAM, whereas the notebook features a Pentium 
Celerion 2GHz CPU and 256 MB RAM. The experiment was performed on a 100M Ethernet 
LAN being used as the communication network. IP phones can perform the watermarking 
operation very quickly as shown in Table 5.2.  
Table 5.2:  Integrity Values  
 
Table 5.3:  Time Cost of transCert Operation  
Time Cost of transServer‘s 
Response Procedure 
Time Cost of Internet Telephone’s 
Acquisition Procedure 
2876.33 ms 5935.85 ms 
 
At the beginning of a conversation, each participating Internet telephone asks for a transCert 
from transServer; the corresponding transServer authenticates the participants, generates a 
pair of transCerts and distributes them to the participating Internet telephones. The Internet 
telephone’s transCert acquisition procedure begins with sending a request to transServer and 
ends with receiving a transCert; transServer’s response procedure begins with receiving a 
request, and ends with the transCert pair distribution. Due to the requirement of real-time 
communication, both the Internet telephones’ acquisition procedure of transCert and 
transServer’s response procedure should work very efficiently. As shown in Table 5.3, the 
average processing time consumed by the transCert operation is well acceptable for both 
Internet telephones and transServer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. Total 
Packet  
No. Packet 
Loss& Delay  
No. Water-mark  
Errors 
Integrity 
Value 
Test 1  16390 6 6 99.96% 
Test 2 ( on busy LAN ) 15952 48 32 99.89% 
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Figure 5.11: Security System Using Watermarking 
 
5.3.3 Experiments In Wireless Local Area Network 
At present IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs [5.1] are spreading very fast. Applying 
Internet Telephony techniques over WLANs may be a low-cost voice communication means 
within enterprise or campus networks. VoIP over WLAN is becoming an important short-
range communication method. Before that can happen, however, two technical problems need 
to be solved. The first is that the system capacity for voice can be quite low in WLAN, and 
Table 5.4 shows some packets are lost in presence of heavy load (> 4Mbps of background 
traffic). The second is that TCP-based applications can bring down VoIP performance.  
 
Table 5.4:  Packet loss in WLAN 
 
 
 
Packet loss in presence of a 4Mbps background traffic 
 
In [5.13], X. Wang investigated the VoIP traffic volume. And he pointed out that 
IEEE 802.11b supports data rates up to 11Mbps and a typical VoIP stream requires less than 
10Kbps. Ideally, the number of simultaneous VoIP streams that can be supported by an 
802.11b WLAN is about 550 sessions. However, due to the added packet-header overheads 
Packet size 120 160 500 1000 
Packet loss rate 22.9 14.6 3.4 0.6 
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and the inefficiency of the WLAN MAC protocol, the experiments point out that the current 
WLAN can only support 12 simultaneous VoIP sessions. At the 802.11 MAC/PHY layers, the 
drop of efficiency is much worse. As a result, the overall efficiency drops to less than 3%.  In 
an enterprise WLAN, the WLAN needs to support other complicated applications besides 
VoIP simultaneously. The TCP connections used by these applications can increase the delay 
and packet-loss rate of VoIP traffic dramatically. This decreases the quality of VoIP sessions.  
 
 
Figure 5.11: Network Scenario 
In this work we propose a new digital watermarking-based integrity method for VoIP 
implementation over WLAN which is robust to considerable distortions often occurring in 
wireless networks. The scenario we are considering is shown in Figure 5.11. The network 
comprises a single IEEE 802.11 basic service set (BSS) with one access point (AP) and a 
number of mobile users. The AP is connected to a 100 Mb/s Ethernet, to which other users are 
directly connected. Voice calls take place between a user in the BSS and an user connected to 
the Ethernet (i.e., between the users Sender and Receiver1). 
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Chapter 6  Voice Cheque Proposal 
 
 
6.1 Security of Mobile Commerce Applications 
6.1.1 State of the Art 
Mobile Commerce [6.1] is a hot topic driven by the fast and widely deployments of 
wireless networks and handheld devices. More and more customers prefer services like 
telephone banking or location-based tracking via their mobile phones or PDAs. Several 
successful operating environments are being widely used now, e.g., NTT DoMoCo’s i-mode 
payment, Nordea’s WAP Solo Mobile Banking Service, and Webraska’s SmartZone 
Platform. 
 But if we look into their schemes carefully, we can find that their security depends 
heavily on the safety of removable/non-removable smart cards [6.2] issued by the 
telecommunication/mobile commerce providers. Even worse, although password is an easy 
and useful access control method, its disposure or misuse may cause disastrous results. In 
addition, with the fast growth of microelectronics technology, smart cards are not safe any 
longer [6.3]. Attackers can scan the smart cards, break the pin-codes, and fake them with 
other ones that hold the same information.  
 
6.1.2 Biometric Identifiers  
Any current Mobile Commerce scenario takes into account security schemes that in 
the end reside into “keeping a secret” (e.g., keeping always your SIM card in your 
possession). In the current work we suggest a solution that does not necessitate that. As we 
know human speech is a unique biometric identifier (as it is the DNA) and it does not change 
its characteristics. On the other hand, speech processing techniques [6.4] provide methods that 
help find the correct speaker of a piece of voice and they are so mature that even the distorted 
speech can be resolved very well. Our desire is to use this unique personal information (our 
special sound and way of speaking) when authenticating ourselves in order to obtain more (in 
terms of security) than when using smart cards. For this we address digital watermarking [6.5, 
6.6], a multimedia processing technology developed in the past several years. By 
watermarking techniques we can insert unique digital watermarks into multimedia data to 
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protect its integrity. In our work, we integrate biometric identification and multimedia 
processing techniques to develop a new authentication approach that does not depend on the 
robustness of smart cards or passwords.  
Using the technologies mentioned above, we propose a new approach, based on Voice 
Cheques (a concept to be introduced further on in the paper), to overcome three important 
security challenges of mobile commerce, naming:  
- authentication of merchants and mobile customers; 
- integrity of transaction data; 
- non-repudiation of transaction. 
The proposed approach is outlined in Figure 6.1. We assume two mobile phones 
being served by a Telecommunication Service Operator. A trustworthy third-party judger, the 
CA (Certification Authority), is in charge of generating unique digital certificates for each 
session and of distributing the digital certificate to the mobile phones. The mobile phones 
have a watermarking module that generates digital watermarks based on the received digital 
certificate and then watermark the outgoing voice stream as well as authenticate the incoming 
voice stream.   
 
Figure 6.1:  Voice Cheque Scheme 
 
6.2 Definition of Voice Cheques 
 
6.2.1 What is a Voice Cheque ? 
 
We define a Voice Cheque as a human speech clip containing embedded digital 
watermarks. The embedded digital watermarks are generated based on the digital certificates 
issued by a Certificate Authority (trustworthy third-party). The digital watermark does not 
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Phone 1 Phone 2 
Watermark 1 Watermark 2 
Communication channel 
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degrade the quality of the speech clips and it is transparent to end users. The advantages of 
voice cheques are: providing very natural HMI to end users, generating legal proofs, non-
repudiation of voice cheques, working smoothly in heterogeneous networks.                          
 Telephone based M-Commerce services can be classified into two classes: voice 
based service and WAP based service. In our scenario and in the voice based banking service 
it is necessary for the staff of a bank and the customer to talk to each other on the phone for a 
short period of time. In this time the unique digital watermarks can be inserted into the voice 
streams to directly generate the voice cheques as shown in Figure 6.2(a). In a WAP based 
environment, at the end of each transaction, the customer needs as well to say a few words on 
the phone.  We call this procedure “biometric identifier collection”. A unique digital 
fingerprint is achieved by applying hash operation on the transaction data to identify this e-
transaction. Then the digital watermarks are engraved into the collected voice to generate the 
voice cheque, as shown in Figure 6.2(b). 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Voice Cheque   (b) WAP based Voice Cheque 
Figure 6.2:  Voice Cheque Scheme 
6.2.2 General Scheme 
 
In general, every cheque should have two properties: The first one is to state clearly 
who is the customer involved in the e-transaction; the second is whether or not this cheque 
has been modified (confidentiality). In our scheme, these issues have been addressed. With 
voice cheques, we can find the correct customer (the identification being based on his unique 
speech, the carrier of the voice cheque). In addition, the voice cheque is fragile. In other 
words, any modification on the transaction data will destroy the digital watermark embedded 
in voice cheque and so, the cheque itself.   
 
In short, the propossed solution is similar to printing watermarks on the paper.  The 
general scheme can be outlined in the following way: 
 
 
 
Transfer $1000000 
to Mr. Dan.... 
Song 
 Hash  
 Transaction 
     Data   
Watermarking 
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6.2.3 Digital Watermark Generation 
 
In Figure 6.3 we illustrate the proposed digital watermark generation for voice based 
(Figure 6.3.a) and WAP based  (Figure 6.3.b.) mobile phones. For the voice based M-
Commerce models, after receiving the digital certificate, the identifier of this transaction, 
ServNum, is signed by the A8 stream cipher by using the digital certificate as the key to 
generate the digital watermark, as illustrated in Figure 6.3.a.. For the WAP based M-
Commerce environments, the cell phone gets the digital fingerprint of the transaction data by 
applying a hash operation and the identifier of the transaction, ServNum, is the key to the hash 
facility. Then the intermediate result is signed by the A8 stream cipher using the digital 
certificate as the key to generate the digital watermark. 
6.2.4 Digital Certificate Generation 
  
Every session has an unique digital certificate which distinguishes the transaction 
from others. As shown in Figure 6.4, in the beginning of each transaction the CA creates one 
random number and then signs it using the RSA algorithm to generate a non-repudiant digital 
certificate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Voice Based Models     (b) WAP Based Models 
Figure 6.3:  Digital Watermark Generation 
 
Random Generator RSA Encryptor 
Digital  
Certificate 
private key 
Stream Cipher Watermark 
Digital  
Certificate 
ServNum 
Cell Phone  
Hash 
Digital  
Certificate 
Cell Phone 
Transaction 
Data  
ServNum 
Stream Cipher Watermark 
1) Collection of the end user’s biometric identifier;  
2) Generation of the digital watermarks; 
3) Insertion of the digital watermarks into the biometric identifier, and in parallel, 
detection of the embedded digital watermarks from the watermarked multimedia 
data; 
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6.2.5 Voice Cheque Generation 
 
A cell phone samples the human speech from its microphone to create PCM raw 
voice and then compresses the raw voice data into a low-rate voice stream using the GSM 
speech coder. In parallel, the cell phone decompresses the incoming compressed voice stream. 
To embed the digital watermarks into the voice stream or MMS-mail, the mobile 
phones should be slightly modified. A watermarking module needs to be installed on the 
mobile phone. Such a module consists of a watermark generator, a watermarking embedder 
and a watermarking extractor. Then the cell phone can take the task of digital watermark 
generation, embedding, and detection. Let us check them in detail. Once a cell phone receives 
the digital certificate from the CA, the watermark generator of the watermarking module 
creates immediately the watermark using the stream cipher; then the digital watermark is 
engraved into the human speech clips and, as well, synchronous signals are inserted into the 
speech clips to embed the period of voice clips. The watermarking module of the cell phone 
extracts the embedded digital watermarks from the incoming voice streams and compares 
them to the correct ones. If the incoming voice streams are acceptable, then the cell phones 
present them to the end users.  
At this moment our system supports digital watermarking for GSM audio streams.  
 
6.3 Authentication 
6.3.1 Authentication Protocol 
We integrate the authentication algorithms used in telecommunications [6.7, 6.8, 6.9, 
6.10] with the mobile commerce authentication protocols.  
A full session procedure occurring between two parties is a transaction. It includes 
the digital certificate handling and the voice stream transmission. Since many voice 
watermarking services may be taken at the same time, in order to make each transaction 
distinguishable, every transaction has a unique identifier, ServNum. 
Similar to the commonly used authentication procedures, in this proposed 
authentication protocol each cell phone holds a shared key (k) with the CA. In the beginning 
of a mobile watermarking service, both cell phones send a dialog_start request to the CA 
and the dialog_start is encrypted using the stream cipher of the cell phones.  
 The CA authenticates the received dialog_start request and, if acceptable, generates a 
random number RAND, signs it using the RSA algorithm to create RANDPK. The CA encrypts  
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RANDPK using the shared key, k, to construct the digital certificate and then sends the digital 
certificate to the cell phones and puts it on file, too. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4:  Outline of the Proposed Scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once the cell phone receives the digital certificate from the CA, the conversation 
between the two cell phones starts. At first, they authenticate the received digital certificate. If 
Phones---->CA { IMSI, TID, RQ_FLAG }k  
CA  Authen{  IMSI, TID, RQ_FLAG }k 
   Generate{ RAND }, Digital Certificate←Sign{ RAND}PK 
CA------->Phones { Digital Certificate, TS, ServNum }k 
Phone  Authen{ { DigCert, TS }k }k 
{   
 Two phones generate the digital watermarks, W,  based on the Digital Certificate; 
 Digital watermarks are inserted into the voice stream;  
 Both phones authenticate the incoming voice stream.  
}  
Phones---->CA { TS, RQ_FLAG, ServNum }k    
CA  Authen{ TS, Status_phone }k 
   Put the digital certificate and ServNum into database 
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
TID temporary ID 
RQ dialog request to CA 
k shared key between CA and a cell phone 
{ X }k encryption of a message, X, using k 
{ X }PK encryption of a message, X, using public key algorithm, key is PK 
RAND random number 
TS time stamp 
ServNum service number 
   Cell Phone CA Cell Phone 
Generate a random number 
Create a digital certificate 
Watermarks the 
outgoing voice stream 
using the received 
digital certificate; 
Verifies the incoming 
watermarked voice 
stream 
Watermarks the 
outgoing voice stream 
using the received 
digital certificate; 
Verifies the  incoming 
watermarked voice 
stream 
Digital Certificate   Digital Certificate 
Finish the dialog and put the 
digital certificate on file 
Voice Streams 
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the authentication is successful, then the cell phones generate the digital watermarks based on 
the received digital certificates. They then insert the digital watermarks into the users' voice 
streams. At the same time both of the phones extract the embedded digital watermarks from 
the incoming voice stream and authenticate the extracted digital watermarks. 
At the end of the dialog each of the cell phone sends a dialog_end request to the CA. 
Finally, the CA authenticates the received dialog_end request and then puts them on file. 
A notice worth to be mentioned here is that both of the participating phones do real-time 
authentication. This means that each of the mobile phones takes the tasks of inserting the 
watermarks into the voice stream and extracting the digital watermarks from the incoming 
voice streams in parallel.  
 
6.3.2 Real-time Authentication 
In order to ensure the overall safety of the communication, real-time authentication is 
employed during the transmission. As depicted in Figure 6.5, the Watermarking Embedding 
Module (Embedder) of one cell phone inserts the digital watermark into the outgoing voice 
stream and the digital certificate is the key. The Watermarking Extractor on the other cell 
phone produces the watermark from the incoming voice stream and uses the digital certificate 
issued by the CA as the key. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Digital Watermarking 
 
6.3.3 Post Authentication 
Post authentication is depicted in Figure 6.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Embedder Extractor Watermarked Voice Stream 
Digital Certificate 
     Voice Stream 
Digital Watermark 
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Figure 6.6 Digital Watermarking 
 
 The digital watermarks embedded in the voice clips are generated based on the digital 
certificates. These certificates have been signed by the CA by means of the RSA private key.  
This means that nobody, except the CA, can recreate the same digital watermarks at any time. 
Of course, each of the digital watermarks is different from the others. 
 The end users can record the conversation too. Once some of them come into any 
dispute, they can present the watermarked conversation to the CA. This authority then obtains 
the proper digital certificate, Cert, and the service number, SN, from the database, DB. It then 
re-generates the digital watermarks and extracts the digital watermarks from the speech clips. 
Finally, the CA compares it with the re-generated digital watermarks. If the extracted digital 
watermarks are the same as the re-generated watermarks, then the presented speech clips can 
be considered as proofs for a legal case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6.4. Experimental Results 
 A prototype has been implemented on desktop computers in order to verify the 
proposed approach. 
 
CA 
1) Users Present the voice cheque to the CA 
( for WAP based voice cheque, the transaction data is also needed ) 
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4) CA  Generate (Digital Certificate, ServNum)   digital watermarks 
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5) CA  Extract (voice cheque, ServNum)   extracted digital watermarks 
6) CA  Compare (generated digital watermarks, extracted digital watermarks) 
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Figure 6.7 Prototype Architecture 
 
We have used two cell phone emulators and a CA emulator. Each cell phone emulator 
used here contains a stream cipher and a watermarking module and the CA emulator consists 
of a random number generator, a RSA encryptor/decryptor and a stream cipher.  
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Cell Phone Emulator 
Transaction Data Recording 
 
RSA Facilities 
 
Communication Authentication 
 
Watermarking Module 
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Chapter 7  Conclusions and Future Research 
 
 
 The work described in this thesis is concerned with the design of security system for 
multimedia communication using digital watermarking techniques. An overview of existing 
watermarking techniques was given and various applications of watermarks were introduced 
and. Digital watermarking was introduced as an alternative to conventional multimedia 
security methods. It overcomes the three basic drawbacks of traditional security mechanisms:  
• First, the traditional methods are sensitive to data distortion ― an unrecoverable bit 
error in the multimedia message or a packet drop during transmission may disable the 
corresponding authentication procedures.  
• Secondly, the traditional methods create a checksum of the message and attach it to 
the target message. Hence, the checksum is apart from the message. A possible 
attacker may get access to the original multimedia message only and then reuse this 
message again and again to cheat the access control systems.  
• Thirdly, these techniques increase the latency of multimedia communication 
considerably, so that the handheld devices (such as PDAs and cellular phones) in 
general cannot meet the resulting computing power requirements. 
 
 This thesis outlines a novel approach to extending well-known digital watermarking 
techniques to the protection of multimedia data during the network transmission within 
distributed highly asymmetric system architectures. An incremental watermarking algorithm 
suitable for low-resource embedded systems to be used in distributed environments is 
presented. The watermarked multimedia data authentication of the proposed scheme (which is 
the main contribution of this thesis) is public; its safety depends on the robustness of the 
underlying RSA algorithm. The main advantages of this approach were demonstrated for 
some use cases. 
The first application scheme developed was based on digital image watermarking. 
This proposed scheme has several advantages and is suitable for real-time image collection: 
The architecture of the scheme is asymmetric; WM_Server’s computation task is heavy, while 
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WM_Sender’s computation task is rather light. In addition, the image authentication is public, 
and a verification of public watermarks is also public.  
Then, a security scheme for real-time speech communications using audio 
watermarking was proposed. The advocated approach adopts public key encryption to 
efficiently generate non-repudiate speech. Finally, a speech watermarking algorithm 
incorporating with GSM 610 full-rate coder was detailed. 
The speech watermarking security architecture for VoIP has been talked by several 
researchers in last year. 
While we mentioned specific future research directions at the end, we would also like 
to present a broad classification of intended future research directions for the sake of 
compactness. Our future research directions can be classified as follows: 
(1) Implementation of the scheme presented in Chapter 4 in commercial telecommunication 
networks and furthers the potential e-commerce application. And the further investigation on 
the performance and usages should be taken. One of the usages of the proposed framework is 
a QoS measurement based on the impact of network on the multimedia data. This 
measurement will provide a more objective measurement on the performance of network 
traffic.  
(2) Design of watermarking algorithms motivated by real-time video telephony: Video 
Telephony is of increasing interest nowadays. Video Telephony needs urgently to solve the 
privacy and confidentiality in order to exploit the M-Commerce applications. Nearly all of the 
mobile video telephony systems work on cell phones or pocket PC. Naturally, the next step is 
to find an answer to the question, “How hard is it to implement complex security solution on 
low-resourced mobile devices?” There are two basic approaches: multimedia data encryption 
and digital watermarking. Watermarking can be an easy way to provide the source origin 
authentication.  
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